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Abstract 
It is uneasy to lose sight of the critical role foreign aid plays in Qatar's 
engagement with the wider world. Since 1995, Qatar has occupied an enviable 
reputation as emerging donor in the Middle East region. It relations with Africa is 
sophistically managed through foreign aid. However, big changes are already 
afoot in the Middle East in general. The outbreak of the Arab Spring has forced 
countries like Qatar to remodel their foreign policies through the use of foreign 
aid in a quest to optimize their gains from this turbulent political environment. To 
this end, this thesis examines changes in Qatar foreign aid in the span of four 
years, 2010 to 2013. Specifically it investigates the extent to which the eruption of 
the Arab Spring in 2011 has shaped Qatar foreign aid and the reflection of this on 
the flow of Qatar external aid to Africa. 
Through a thorough analysis of Qatar Foreign Aid Reports of 2010, 2011, 
2012 and 2013, it is  found that changes in the overall architecture of Qatar 
foreign aid- in terms of volume and the recipient countries- are determined by the 
Arab Spring. Nevertheless, the extent to which the Arab Spring has remodeled 
Qatar foreign aid to Africa is generally imprecise and sketchy. The volume and 
the recipient of Qatar development assistance to Africa remained stable and 
consistent in the last past five years, and the insignificant changes in the recipients 
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of Qatar foreign aid to Africa is connected to factors associated with political and 
economic developments in different African countries.  
The stability in Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa, despite the dynamic 
of Qatar foreign policy, discloses that Africa occupies footnote position in 
Qatar foreign policy priorities; and it also reveals that Qatar could not realize 
the importance of the Africa in the context of its struggle to optimize its gain 
from the Arab Spring. As Qatar lacks alternative and meaningful foreign 
policy to engage with Africa than foreign aid, it should relax its dependence 
on its NGOs to carry out this task. This should allow Qatar to strategically us 
its aid to Africa in a quest to advance its national interests in the continent. 
 
Keyword: Foreign aid, Africa, Arab Spring, Qatar. 
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Introduction 
Flows of foreign aid to recipient countries have been highly volatile over 
the past 60 years, and there are significant evidences that this volatility is caused 
by interplay of political and economic factors and changes in domestic, regional 
and international settings. The efforts of donor countries to optimize their gains 
from these changes drive their aid allocation in terms of volume, recipient 
countries and motives. Political and economic developments that followed the 
Second World War have widely influenced foreign aid disbursement of many 
donor countries. The stream of large size of US aid to Turkey and Greece, and its 
Marshall Plan of four years $13 billion aid program for the recovery of war-
affected countries in other European countries matched with United States 
concern over the expansion of Soviet Union's influence in Europe in the post 
Second World War bipolar system (Lancaster, 2007). Similarly, the rise of 
Socialist aspiration in Africa, and the European fright for their former colonies' 
association with the Soviet Union induced the flow of large among of French and 
British  aid to Africa to facilitate the development of their colonies and to sustain 
the predominance of their influences in these countries (Van Der Veen, 2011). 
The dynamics of politics in the Middle East region in 1960s and 1970s  also 
inspired number of developing countries of the Middle East ( notably oil 
producing countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
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Iraq, Libya and Algeria) to provide financial support to developing countries in 
Africa in search for political reward in their conflict with Israel. 
Thus, dynamics of politics at regional and international levels have 
brought changes in foreign aid architectures of donor countries since the outset of 
exploiting foreign aid as foreign policy tool. Since the Middle East region has 
been undergoing many changes after the Arab Spring 2011, one would expect to 
see changes in the aid strategy of major players in this hostile and unstable region, 
especially in the Middle East many countries have had to use foreign aid to 
compensate for their limited diplomatic and military capacities. This is even more 
acute in the case of Qatar which has emerged recently as game changer in the 
Middle East region in general and the Gulf region in particular. 
It is uneasy to lose sight of the critical role foreign aid plays in Qatar's 
engagement with the wider world. Qatar has occupied an enviable reputation as 
emerging donor in the Middle East region. As a middle power at the regional 
stage, foreign aid has played a unique role in projecting Qatar interests in Europe, 
Asia and America. In addition to these continents, Qatar official development 
assistance has being labored as sophisticated foreign policy tool to manage its 
relations with African countries. The return on Qatar foreign aid to Africa can be 
calculated in terms of new trade and investment opportunities, political reward 
and religious promotion. However, big changes are already afoot in the Middle 
East in general, and in the Gulf region in particular. The outbreak of the Arab 
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Spring and ensuing political disruption have caused remodeling of foreign 
policies, and they have also offered opportunity for rich countries like Qatar to 
use its foreign aid to enhance its position in a quest to optimize its gains from this 
turbulent political environment.  
Against this background, this thesis studies changes in Qatar foreign aid 
architecture in light of the Arab Spring. In more specific terms, it examines the 
extent to which the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011 has shaped Qatar foreign 
aid in terms of volumes it allocates, countries that receive this aid, and the 
motives of this aid. In this connection, the thesis also inspects the effects of the 
Arab Spring on Qatar foreign aid allocation and how this has reflected in the flow 
of Qatar foreign aid to Africa
1
. The foreign aid strategies and the ensuing flow of 
aid to receiving countries are, in many ways, symptomatic of the strategic 
importance of these countries to donor countries. Therefore, stability or dynamism 
in the flow of Qatar aid to Africa, in light of Qatar constant struggle to benefit 
from regional political status quo, should suggest the significance of Africa or its 
triviality to Qatar foreign policy objectives.  
Literature Review: 
Qatar foreign aid is echoed in literature that considers Arab foreign aid in 
general and Gulf foreign aid in particular. However, despite the qualified 
                                                 
1  Unless it is stated otherwise, the term Africa in this thesis refers to all African countries with 
exclusion of North African countries which includes Egypt, Tunis, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, 
Algeria and South and Northern Sudan. 
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substance of this literature, little attention is given to how the Gulf States‟ aid 
allocation is influenced by dynamics of politics at the regional level. In general, 
precedent literature that explored Arab and Gulf foreign aid mainly focused on the 
main aid donors and the characteristics their aid. Although recent studies have 
extensively examined how the outbreak of the Arab Spring has induced Qatar and 
other Gulf States to refine aid and investment into sophisticated foreign policy 
tools, the extent to which Arab Spring created a shift in foreign aid recipients is 
less emphasized by these past studies. Similarly, there is little, if any attempt, to 
examine how the Arab uprising could have reshaped the flow of Gulf aid in 
general, and flow of Qatar foreign aid in particular to African countries. To this 
end, the thesis will take traditional or narrative approach to literature review in 
order to critique and summarize a body of literature and relevant studies that 
addressed the subject of Arab and Gulf  foreign aid in general and Qatar foreign 
aid in particular. In this connection, literature will be divided into categories or 
themes. 
 
Gulf States as Emerging Aid Donors 
Relevant literature (Hunter, 1984; Kilby, 2011; Momani & Ennis, 2012; 
Neumayer, 2002, 2003; Villanger, 2007) which explored the Arab aid allocation 
suggested the existence of a complex of bilateral aid donors that were established 
decades ago to facilitate the management of aid giving of Arab-Gulf states (also 
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Gulf Cooperation Councile GCC members). In this connection Momani and Ennis 
(2012) suggested that shift in political and economic power away from the west to 
the south has led to the emergence of new donors in development aid scene. 
Momani and Ennis (2012) referred to the oil boom as catalyst in the introduction 
of new players in the foreign aid outside member of Development Assistant 
Committee (DAC); the six members of the GCC are poited out by Momani and 
Ennis as rising donor groups. The nationalization of oil industries in these 
countries in 1960s has set the stage for the Gulf countries to play decisive role in 
international cooperation (Momani & Ennis, 2012).  In contrast to Momani and 
Ennis  (2012), and  in analysing the organizational structure of development 
finance provided by Arab donors, Neumayer (2012) reduced the Gulf donors to 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as three Arab donors that 
have orgarnised their aid giving through their national agencies
2
.  
  Hunter (1984) ecohed Neumayer (2012) in refering to Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and UAE as major providers of the Gulf bilateral aid; however, in 
discussion the aid programs of Organization of Petroluem Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), Hunter recommeded the role of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and to some 
extent Qatar and UAE, in Arab aid giving to champion  the Arab cause through 
their  financial leverage. According to Hunter (1984) these countries have 
                                                 
2 The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development established in 1961; The Saudi Fund for 
Development established in 1974 and The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development established in 1971. 
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committed to the ideal of Arab unity and the Arab political and economic 
objectives. Thus, their new wealth in the form of oil was used to achieve these 
objectives; this in turn spotlighted thier position among Arabs as major aid donors 
to developing countries.   
In addition to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, recent literature also took account 
of Qatar as one of new emerging aid donors in the  Arab world which extensively 
bends on foreign aid as its diplomatic tool. For example, Kamrava  (2011) argued 
that the emergence of Qatar as a successful mediator between conflicting parties 
in Yeman, Sudan, Lebanon and Eretria is attributed to her financial incentives that 
are given to conflicting parties. Colombo ( 2012) concured with Kamarave in 
emphasing the leading role of Qatar in using its financial resource to achieve its 
trategic interets. He asserted that the concurrent of surge in Qatar diplomacy and 
political upheaval that followed the 2011 Arabs uprising has been an opportunity 
for the state of Qatar to expand her aid giving at regional level not only to boost 
the economic stability of the recipient countries, but also to protect herself from 
the wave of political unrest that could have jeopardized her own stability. While 
Colombo (2012) recognized the fact that all other three GCC states (Kingdom of 
Saudi Arab, Kuwait and UAE) have been providing foreign aid during the Arab 
Spring, he held that Qataris the most active among these countries because of her 
wish to gain the influence in the region.  
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Characteristics of the Gulf aid 
 Past studies (Momani & Ennis, 2013; Neumayer, 2004; Shihata, 1982; 
Shushan & Marcoux, 2011; Villanger, 2007) referred to certain characteristics 
that make the Gulf aid different for the aid of Western donors. The most striking 
characteristic of the Gulf aid is its volatility. Unlike aid from Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistant 
Committee (DAC), the Gulf aid commitment is severely determined by oil 
production and price. For example,  development aid as percentage of Gross 
National Products (GNP) of Gulf States decreased from 12.48% in 1973, at high 
of oil boom, to 5.94% in 1978 and 2.38% of GNP in 1985 (Momani & Ennis, 
2012). Another characteristic of the Gulf aid is that, in contrast to Western donors, 
their aid lacks transparency and consistency in record keeping. The barriers to 
achieve transparency stems from two sides: firs; insufficient data provided by 
national aid agencies. Second: unreported transfer made by the Gulf countries 
which bypass national agencies (Shushan & Marcoux, 2011). The Gulf countries 
also exhibit distinctive character in terms of absolute volume as well as their 
generosity. While DAC members never come close to hit United Nations UN 
mark of 0.7% minimum of ODA in GNP, during 1973- 2008, the average of the 
Gulf donors ODA combined GNP stand at 1.5% (World Bank, 2010). Perhaps the 
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most characteristic of the Gulf aid givers is their adherence to the principle of 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of recipient countries. The Gulf donors do 
not prescribe any development or economic policies for the countries that receive 
their aid neither do they require democratic reforms for receiving their financial 
assistance (Villanger, 2007) 
 In terms of motives or objectives of the Gulf aid, the issue has been a 
subject of scholastic debate. For example, Hunter (1984)argued that Arab 
members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC, which include 
the Gulf countries, are motivated by security, political-ideological and economic 
objectives. The same argument is advanced by Neumayer (2003b)  who believed 
that complex wed of political, economic and security objectives drive the Arab 
donors including the Gulf states to give aid. Like Hunter (1984) and Neumayer 
(2003) Villanger, (2007a) subscribed to the same belief; he argued that political 
and economic motives are also considered as other motives behind the Gulf aid 
giving. According to him the Gulf foreign aid is used to reward their allies and to 
build strategic alliances. The Kuwait-Iraq war is cited by Villanger (2007) as an 
example in which Gulf donors used their aids to gather support for Kuwait and 
deprived recipients that sided with Iraq during the War. In addition to political 
motives, Villanger (2007a) also cited promotion of religion as motives for the 
Gulf aid . On other hand, Shihata (1982) stressed that Arab aid including that of 
the Gulf is generous, untied and diversified in terms its recipients. Form his 
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perspective, Arab aid is pure altruistic and not meant to achieve political or 
economic objectives.  
 Regarding the recipients of the Gulf aid, different literature suggested that 
wide ranges of poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia benefit from the 
Gulf aid. However  they recognized that since the beginning of their foreign aid, 
promotion of Arab solidarity was widely observed as motives behind the foreign 
aid of Gulf States; thus, the most recipients of the Gulf financial was exclusively 
allocated for Arab countries(Bin, Al, & May, 2012; Hunter, 1984; Neumayer, 
2003; Shushan & Marcoux, 2011; Villanger, 2007). Additionally Neumayer 
(2012) found that Arab, Sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic as well as countries with 
voting similar to Saudi Arabia in the UN are more likely to receive the Arab aid. 
Regional Politics aid Gulf Foreign Aid  
Past studies that studied foreign aid of the Gulf States mainly cited factors 
related to regional politics as stimulator of changes in Gulf aid giving in general 
and their aid flow to Africa in particular. For instance, Villanger (2007) suggested 
that the Gulf aid provision is driven by the dynamics of politics at regional levels. 
To him, the Iraq-Iran war of 1980s, and the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1991 were 
impulsive in the Gulf countries' aid giving especially to Iraq-- in which Kuwait 
emerged as major donor-- and to Kuwait to reconstruct the country on the wake of 
the Iraq invasion. Similarly, Barakat & Zyck (2010) shared with Villanger (2007) 
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the impact of regional development like Iraq-Iran war and Iraq invasion of Kuwait 
on the flow of the Gulf aid in terms of increase and decrease in the volume. In this 
connection, the surge in Gulf aid in the mid-1970s to early 1980s are highlighted 
to be correlated closely with rising crude oil prices and rises in crises in the 
Middle East. Likewise, the fall in the volume of official aid from the Gulf States 
in the mid- to late-1980s is viewed by Barakat & Zyck (2010) in the context of 
Iran-Iraq war and the consumption of the Gulf state with securing the survival of 
their regimes amid domestic and regional threats. Additionally they argued that 
the sharp rise in official aid in 1990 reflected a quadrupling of aid from the region 
in response to Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait, which was facilitated by the 
simultaneous and closely related jump in crude oil prices. See the Figure (1). 
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 Figure (1) Gulf States ODA, 1970-2007. Cited from  Barakat & Zyck (2010) 
 
 
 
In relation to the flow of Arab and Gulf aid to Africa, Al Sarihan (2012) 
argued that a positive change in Arab-African relations in 1970s has stimulated 
Arabs to allocate their foreign aid to Africa. According to him the Arab concerns 
about Palestinian issues forced them to engage with Africans in a quest to win the 
support of the later in championing the Palestinian cause at international level. Al 
Sarihan (2012) further held that the huge economic capability of Arabs as the 
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result of their oil revenues permitted them to use oil not only to fight Israel, but 
also to entice Africans to take side with Arabs vis-a-vi Palestinian cause. This, 
according Al-Sarihan (2012) has positively changed the volume of Arab aid to 
Africa in early 1970s compared to the late 1970s after the Camp David 
agreement. See the figure (2).  
1977-1980 
 
1973-1977 Recipient countries 
2,57  4,85 Chad 
6,33   7,14 Benin 
0,22  9,11 Togo 
1,64   2,18 Gambia 
4,155  7,79 Mali 
0,195  3,49 Niger 
5,167  7,202 Senegal 
Figure (2), Arab Multilaterals Aid to some Africa from 1973-1980 in Million $ ( 
Al-Sharihan, 2012; p102) 
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   Hunter (1984) echoed Al-Sharihan (2012) as she ascribed the extensive 
flow of Arab aid to Africa in 1960s and 1970s to dynamics of politics in the 
Middle East region. In this context Hunter specifically related the use of aid in the 
context Arab foreign policy to the prevalent trend of supporting Arab cause in the 
Arab Israel conflict in 1960s and 70s. According to her, the quest for political 
reward prompted the Arab donors to employ their oil wealth as foreign policy 
mean and provide financial aid to their African counterparts in a bid to win their 
supports. In this connection, she specifically referred to Saudi Arabia as one of 
the largest economic donors in 1970s as its aid has widely received by African 
countries as illustrated in figure (3).  
Total Value in Saudi 
Riyal. Million  
No. of Projects Country 
292/00  7 Guinea Conakry 
42/99  6 Kenya 
308/721  11 Mali 
168/30  6 Niger 
643/30  12 Senegal 
 Figure (3), Saudi Aid in the form of Loan to African countries 1974-82 –
(Hunter, 1984; p 139)                               
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 Similarly, Hunter (1984) believed that drastic changes in the regional 
balance of power due to an increase in the power and influence of the two larger 
regional states-Iran and Iraq has threatened Saudi Arabia and small Gulf states; 
thus, Saudi Arabia attempted to maintain a favorable balance of power to achieve 
the interests of Arab Gulf monarchies by extending its foreign aid to the Horn of 
Africa particularly. According Hunter, the Horn of Africa is of geo-strategic 
importance to the Saudis in the context of the Arab Israel conflict as well as in the 
context of Iranian threats of exporting revolution to the Gulf. These factors 
compelled Saudi Arabia to allocated aid to the Horn of Africa, which controls the 
gate to Bab-al-Mendab, in order to secure its interest in of the world important 
maritime choke point (Hunter, 1984). 
Additionally, (Chibwe, 1977) argued that the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict 
acted as a stimulus for the improvement of Arab co-operation with Africa and 
with the Third World in general. According to him political sympathy between 
African and Arabs has been an excellent factors in the increase of the value of 
financial transfer from the Special Arab Fund for Africa in 1970, the heyday of 
Arab African cooperation. See figure (4). 
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Value of each installment in US $ 
 
Country 
3,600,000 Ivory Coast  
7,100,00 Ethiopia  
3,750,000 Senegal  
4,400,000 Chad  
5,650,000 Uganda  
Figure (4), Sample of Loans from the Special Arab Fund for Africa 1974-1975– 
(Chibwe, 1977; p 166) 
Likewise Sylvester (1981) echoed Chibwe, (1977), Hunter (1984) Al-
Sharihan (2012) in referring to dynamics of politics in Middle East in 1970s as 
formidable factor in the flow large share of the Arab aid to Africa. However, he 
was specific in the motives for the flow of this aid to Africa. According to him, 
the motives ranging from political self-interest to humanitarian altruism prompted 
oil-rich Arab countries to open their purses wide for the benefit of Africa in 
1970s.  
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The Arab Spring and Gulf Foreign Aid 
Likewise, recent studies on the Gulf foreign policy has observed 
unprecedented surge in the Gulf States' use of foreign aid to achieve their 
collective and individual purposes.  For example, Colombo ( 2012) related this 
surge to the political upheaval that followed the 2011 Arabs uprising; hence, this 
development has been an opportunity for Gulf States to expand their aid giving at 
regional level. In this context large amount of aid has been flowing to the Arab 
Spring countries not only to boost the economic stability of the recipient 
countries, but also to protect the donor's interests and prevent the wave of political 
unrest that could have jeopardized their own stability from reaching their 
countries (Colombo, 2012). Like Colombo (2012), Talbot (2012) also associated 
the rise in the volume the Gulf foreign aid to the Arab Spring as he understood 
that  Egypt has been in the forefront of countries that received the largest amount 
of the Gulf aid for political, economic and security interests of the Gulf States.  
For instance, in May 2011 the UAE pledged $ 3b ; Saudi also promised to provide 
$ 4b in loan, deposits and grants; and Qatar promised $ 10b through investment 
(Talbot, 2012). Although these pledges were not materialized at the time, Saudi 
Arabia released aid to Egypt following Muhammad Morsi's visit to Saudi when 
aid package worth $ 500m was provided to Egypt.  This was followed by a 
deposit of $1 billion to Egypt Central Bank, and $5m was later transferred to buy 
Egyptian T-bones. Additionally, $430m for projects in Egypt was also provided 
 17 
 
(Talbot, 2012).  Qatar's hyper foreign policy ambitions and its ardent support for 
revolution prompted her to deposit $ 500m to boost Egyptian foreign reserves in 
2011; moreover the Qatar monarch announced a $2 billion deposit with Egypt 
central Bank (Talbot, 2012).Although the UAE and Kuwait remained ambivalent 
to fulfill their aid pledge, few days after the toppling of Morsi by the Egyptian 
Supreme Council of the Arm Forces SCAF, Saudi Arabia and UAE pledged a 
total of $8b in aid package to support Egyptian government. In following days, 
Kuwait also announced the aid package of $4b (the Pulse of the Middle East,” 
n.d.) 
 While acknowledging the Arab Spring's factor in pushing the use of 
foreign aid by Gulf states, Colombo (2012) maintained that the Sunni-vs Shias's 
dichotomy aroused the Gulf countries to use aid in response to the Arab spring in 
Syria and Bahrain (Colombo, 2012). The Gulf countries uneasiness with Iran's 
outreach and influence in Syrian and Bahrain stimulated them to provide different 
sorts of aid to different liberal and Islamic groups in Syria in a bid to topple 
Bashar Assad's regime. Similar motivation forced the Gulf countries to provide 
aid to Bahrain and Oman in order to consolidate Al-Khalifa regime against mainly 
Shiiats protests.  Meanwhile, Qatar's efforts to assume regional leadership amid 
the consumption of traditional regional leaders like Saudi Arabia and Egypt by 
internal instability drove the tiny Gulf state of Qatar to funnel aid to Libyan 
revolutionists to topple the regime of Ghaddafi(Khatib, 2013). 
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Although the Gulf involvement in Syrian conflict is understood to be 
escorted by financial supports, -as Qatar and Saudi Arabia heavily involved in the 
Syrian civil war through a state sponsorship of various groupings, in addition to 
activity from independent Gulf charities and individuals, the motive for this 
financial involvement is understood differently. For example, report of Middle 
East Centre of London School of Economy (2014) stated that even though the 
sectarianism is interpreted as the main driver for Gulf financial involvement in 
Syria, a depth analysis of Qatar and Saudi‟s foreign policies reveals a much more 
complex reality. According to this report the flow of Qatar and Saudi aid to Syria 
is akin to a proxy war, very different to a mere primordial civilization clash 
between Shia‟ and Sunni Muslims. This is evident in the switching of Saudi and 
Qatari support between different opposition groups in Syria, which has led to 
factionalization among the Syrian opposition.  
Research Questions 
Overall, the referred literature that considered the Gulf foreign aid mainly 
fleshed out the major donors and the characteristics of their aid with little focus on 
how different factors define the volume, the recipients and the purposes of Gulf 
aid in general and Qatar foreign in particular. Added to this, earliest studies in the 
subject matter suffered from the following shortcomings: 
First: These studies are general as they collectively dealt with foreign aid 
flow of the Arabs Gulf countries to different countries. Thus; they failed to take 
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the advantage of case study that could permit them to intensively describe and 
analyze a single individual case of one Gulf state foreign aid allocation in terms of 
motives, recipients and volume. Although Arab and Gulf countries have a lot in 
common, however it is misleading to believe that their politics and foreign 
policies for that matter are driven by similar factors and that they pursue similar 
foreign policy objectives. 
Second:  previous studies were mostly concern about how the Arab Spring 
has shaped the foreign aid of Gulf States to Arab Spring countries; thus, they 
could not make extra effort to investigate how the Arab Spring could remodel the 
allocation of Gulf aid to other countries that were immune from the effects of the 
turbulent events of the Arab Spring. 
Third: Literature related to the flow of Arab and Gulf aid to Africa is 
generally scant and the available ones are outdated to rely upon them as they no 
longer reflect the philosophies that guide the allocation of Gulf foreign aid in 
general and Qatar foreign aid in particular. Leadership changes in many Gulf 
States and dynamics of the politics in the region has tremendously transformed 
how their foreign policies are projected as so as their foreign aid.  
Finally, most of these previous studies are literature based researches and 
none has combined quantitative and qualitative strategies to collect data in a quest 
to serve for the mutual validation of data and findings as well as for the 
production of a more coherent and complete picture of the investigated topic. 
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Thus, they either answer what or why or how questions in relation to changes in 
the architecture of the Gulf foreign aid.  
In light of the above mentioned shortcomings in literature that examined 
the subject, this study will contribute to existing literature by investigating 
changes in Qatar foreign aid since 2010. Ultimately, our intention is to understand 
the extent the Arab Spring constituted a formidable factor in these changes, and 
how these changes are particularly mirrored in Qatar aid flow to Africa. 
To this end, this thesis enquires into three main questions:  
- What are the patterns of changes that occur in Qatar foreign aid 
disbursement since the outbreak of the Arab Spring?  
- To what extent these changes are triggered by the Arab Spring?  
- How these have shaped the volume, the recipients and the motives of 
Qatar foreign aid to Africa?  
To answer these questions, this thesis is guided by Foreign Policy Change 
Approach which explains factors that brought changes in relations to foreign 
policy. Foreign Policy Approach identified three factors that induce countries to 
consider changes in their foreign policies. These factors include (1) changes in 
individuals or leadership (foreign policy changes due to cognitive and 
motivational psychology of individuals or leaders); (2) changes in state 
institutions, domestic and regional structure (domestic and regional structures 
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provide clues to the possibilities of changes and obstacles to changes within a 
given polity in order to optimize gains); (3) changes in political regimes (state 
moving from democratic to authoritarian regime changes foreign policy of that 
state) (Alden &Aran, 2012) . 
While this approach examines factors that brought changes in overall 
foreign policy, it also fits to examine changes in the architecture of foreign aid of 
a country as foreign aid is enveloped in foreign policy and it is a device of foreign 
policy. Therefore, this study considers the effect of one factor, which is the effect 
of changes in regional structure (Arab Spring in our case) on foreign aid of Qatar 
in terms of recipient, volume and objectives.   
The Arab Spring has brought changes in the Middle East in general and 
Gulf in particular, as it has reconfigured regional structure and reshaped relations 
between countries; ultimately it has shaped foreign policies including foreign aid 
allocation. In this connection, we examine how it has changed foreign aid 
architecture of the state of Qatar.  
Significances of the Study 
This study has scientific and practical significances. Scientifically, 
because Qatar foreign aid is generally under-researched, this study will enrich the 
bulk of literature that focused on Qatar foreign aid in general and Gulf foreign aid 
in particular. Similarly this study will also contribute in enriching the field of 
Gulf- African relations which is largely ignored by literature. Moreover, as this 
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study is mixed-method designed, it will expand the research on Gulf foreign aid in 
general and Qatar foreign aid in particular in a way that a single approach cannot 
do. The process of offering a statistical analysis of aid allocation, along with 
survey of literatures make the research more comprehensive compared to previous 
studies. Added to this and to understand why Qatar foreign aid has increased to 
Africa, despite the challenges of the Arab Spring, will challenge taken-for- 
granted theories that assume the lack of capability of small states to manage their 
relations in time of turbulence.    
 Practically, to understand exactly that regional factors like the Arab 
Spring prompted Qatar to diversify the allocation of its foreign aid to other 
regions beyond the Middle East will inform help policymakers in recipient 
countries of Qatar aid the volatility and reliability of Qatar foreign aid. 
Additionally, the increase of Qatar foreign aid to Africa in light of the Arab 
Spring will deepen our understanding about the strategic importance of Africa in 
addressing political, economic and security challenges that face Qatar in the 
context of the Arab Spring. Conversely, the decrease or stability of this aid to 
Africa will make us to comprehend the triviality of Africa to Qatar foreign policy 
as the ensuing flow of aid to receiving countries are, in many ways, symptomatic 
of the strategic importance of these countries to donor countries in projecting their 
national interest at regional and international levels. 
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Research Methodology  
This research combines both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
to answer the questions of the extent Qatar 's foreign aid has changed since the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring, and whether the Arab Spring has any significant 
effect on Qatar foreign aid to Africa. On the one hand, qualitative method is 
appropriate to analyze how and why the Arab Spring could change Qatar foreign 
aid to African countries. In order to reach these answers, survey of literature was 
conducted to examine the wide range of primary and secondary data drawn from 
different sources. These sources, which include, but not limited to, books, 
magazine articles, journal articles, online newspapers, reports and documents 
from think tanks and the governments of Qatar were selected according to their 
relations to the main themes of the thesis, Arab and Gulf foreign aid, the effect of 
Arab Spring on the Gulf policies, Qatar foreign policy, Qatar- African relations 
and Qatar foreign aid. In reviewing materials driven from these sources, data were 
categorized according to themes before they were tabled and filtered eventually. 
In the subsequent stage of reading, relevant information and data were note-taken 
and used in different part of thesis according to their appropriateness in explaining 
the impact of the Arab Spring on the flow of Qatar foreign aid in terms of 
recipients, volumes and motives.  This literature survey, as research method 
technique, is important in this study to scan as much as many literature as possible 
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on the issue. In light of scarcity of resource on the topic, literature in both English 
and Arabic language were consulted.   
On the other hand, quantitative method was used to consult reports of 
Qatar Foreign Aid allocation in the span of four years – 2010 to 2013. These 
reports were collected personally from department of international cooperation, 
Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Types of information extracted from these 
reports include volume of Qatar foreign, recipients of this aid and its objectives. 
In order  to detect changes  in Qatar foreign aid architecture in terms of the 
volume of Qatar foreign aid, the recipients and the motives or objectives, 
Microsoft Excel sheet was used to produce data and chats that will enable us to 
follow the trend of changes during the period of studies. In this regard, bi-variable 
analysis was conducted to see how two variables change together. To this end, 
year was considered as independent variable while volume, recipient and motives 
of Qatar foreign aid were used as dependent variables. 
Limitation if the Study:    
Generally, this research has the following limitations: 
1- Literature upon which this study relied to highlight the flow of Qatar 
foreign aid to Africa is scant and the available once are outdated. Thus, 
they are insufficient to explain the motives and objectives of Qatar foreign 
aid to Africa, as well as the factors that determine the flow of this aid.  
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2- This study analyzed the reports of Qatar foreign aid allocation from 2010 
to 2013; while this is sufficient to report the changes in the allocation of 
Qatar foreign, there is possibility that changes in 2010 and 2012 will be 
clearly understood when we compare it with reports of 2008 and 2009, 
which were not available to linked them with trend of changes in 2010 
upward.  
3- There is a concern about the authenticity of data from the report as the 
data are compiled by the Ministry of foreign Affairs. While this data may 
represent genuine figures of Qatar foreign aid flow, there is possibility that 
the data could be manipulated for political purposes. 
Organization of the thesis: 
  After introducing the topic, chapter one analyzes foreign aid from 
theoretical and conceptual perspectives in order to understand the spectrum on 
which Qatar foreign aid rests. To this end, various definitions of foreign aid are 
discussed; this is followed by a rather lengthy discussion of historical 
development of foreign aid, types of aid and theoretical explanation of why 
governments give aid to other governments. To locate the importance of foreign 
aid in Qatar foreign policy, chapter two discusses Qatar foreign policy towards 
Africa. In the first part of this chapter, light is shed on interplay of changes that 
shape Qatar foreign policy strategies and tactics including foreign aid. The second 
part of this chapter discloses how leadership changes and changes in regional 
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politics defined Qatar strategic interest in Africa and tools it exploited to reach 
these goals and objectives in Africa. In this connection, emphasis is placed on 
foreign aid as a viable foreign policy tool at the disposal of the state Qatar in its 
engagement with Africa.  
In the final chapter (chapter three), finding of the thesis is presented. However, in 
the first part of this chapter institutional aspect of Qatar foreign aid is treated; this 
uncovers the role played by both the government of Qatar and NGOs in allocation 
of Qatar development assistance to various countries. The closing part of this 
chapter is devoted to the discussion of the results of the research. In addition to 
the changes in Qatar foreign in terms of volume, recipients and motive, this part 
also presents the effects of the Arab Spring on these changes, and how this is 
reflected on Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa. Based on the final results, the 
conclusion of this thesis describes the relevant importance of Africa to the state of 
Qatar, it also recommends policy options about how Qatar could strategically use 
its foreign to Africa to promote its national interests in the continent. 
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Chapter One 
Foreign Aid: Theoretical and Conceptual 
Perspectives 
 
Introduction 
One of the scholars who led the way for the study of international 
relations, Hans Morgenthau, concluded that foreign aid is one of the innovations 
which the contemporary age has brought into the practice of foreign policy 
(Morgenthau, 1962; cited in Lancaster, 2007).  Foreign aid, as it stands today, has 
become a familiar and an expected element in relations between states. Until 
1950s, it was provided to meet the need for emergency relief in war-torn countries 
after World War II (Lancaster, 2007). The creation of the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Agency, and the International Refuge Organization were 
basically meant to facilitate the short-lived provision of this emergency relief to 
war-affected countries. However, political and economic developments that 
followed the Second World War have altered the use of aid from emergency relief 
to an instrument of Cold War diplomacy (Lancaster, 2007).  Since then and after 
over sixty years, financial assistance that is provided by rich countries to less-
fortunate ones has become a permanent foreign policy tool for developed and 
developing countries alike in pursuance of their national interests (Neumayer, 
2003).  
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In this chapter we discuss the theoretical and conceptual aspects of foreign 
aid; the chapter digs deeper to present multiple definitions of foreign aid, 
historical evolution of this aid, theoretical explanations of why governments give 
aid and the mix of purposes governments pursue with their aid. 
Foreign aid: Definitions 
 Financial aid that is provided by governments or international 
organizations to states and nations bears different terms; the definitions of these 
terms themselves are different as people who defined them. Foreign aid is one of 
the familiar terms that are used to refer to financial aid; however its definition is 
varied and confusing with some associate concepts that also refer to financial aid. 
For some, foreign aid or foreign assistance encompasses all expenditures provided 
by developed countries to assist foreign countries in the spheres of economic 
development, humanitarian assistances, disaster responses, security and military 
assistance, government and rule of law, health and trade development (Veillette & 
Division, 2008). According to this definition, foreign aid ranges from financial 
assistance to the financing of different economic and development programs in a 
foreign country. While this definition puts emphasis on different purposes of aid 
allocation, it has overlooked different forms through which aid is given; these 
include grants, loans and technical assistance etc.  
In contrast to this definition, improving human condition is recognized in 
some definitions as default objectives of foreign aid. For example, Lancaster  
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( 2007: p. 9) uses the term foreign aid to refer to " voluntary transfer of public 
resources from a government to another independent government, to an NGO, or 
to international organization with at least 25 percent grant element one goal of 
which is to improve the human condition in the country receiving the aid. As this 
definition narrows the purposes of foreign aid to the betterment of human 
condition in the recipient country, it excludes from the broad category of aid the 
military assistance or military expenditure abroad, credits and capitals the 
government provides to finance subsidies and promote investment abroad, 
expenditures related to intelligence and funding to fight terrorism or international 
crime. While foreign aid provided under this category can contribute, in a long 
term, to the betterment of human condition and to the reduction of poverty, their 
immediate purposes being achieving objectives other than the improvement of 
human condition exclude them from Lancaster's definition of foreign aid. 
Additionally, his definition does not include private charitable giving (e.g. 
contributions from individuals or corporation to NGOs, aid from private 
philanthropic foundations or corporate entities, or remittance from foreign 
workers to their home countries) from foreign aid as these types of aid are not 
provided by governments. 
 Unlike the standard approach to defining foreign aid by focusing 
predominantly on the purposes for which the aid is given, Riddell (2007) took 
different approach by looking at resources of which foreign aid consists of. 
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Reddell has defined foreign aid as all resources- physical goods, skill and 
technical know-how, financial grants or loans ( at concessional rates)- transferred 
by donors to recipients. Despite the comprehensiveness of Reddell‟s definition in 
terms of referring to many resources governments use for aid, it leaves many 
crucial questions unanswered. These questions include who gives aid, to whom 
and why. 
The domination of foreign aid giving by so-called first world or developed 
countries tempted some scholars to restrict foreign to aid provided by that part of 
the world. For instance, foreign aid is defined by Lumsdaine (1993: p.33) as "gifts 
and concessional loans of economic resources, such as finance and technology, 
employed for economic purposes provided to less developed countries by 
governments of developed democracies, directly or indirectly". What can be 
deduced from this definition is that it disregards financial assistance provided by 
autocratic regimes in the second and their worlds. Middle East is a home to 
emerging donors whose volume of aid exceeds the target set by the World 
Bank(Shushan & Marcoux, 2011). 
 While foreign aid is the standard term to refer to the practice of aid giving, 
there are other terms that are used interchangeably with foreign aid to refer to aid 
provided by governments to other government. These terms include Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Assistance (OD). ODA and OA are 
terms coined by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization 
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for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to describe concessional 
transfers which contribute to both the development and humanitarian and 
emergency objectives in advanced nation and countries in transitions (OA) and to 
lower and middle income countries (ODA) (Riddell, 2007).  DAC describes 
transfer as development aid only if the objective is to promote welfare and 
development. Like other definitions, the definition of ODA and OA exclude any 
aid funds raised and allocated by private organizations or foundations, NGOs or 
individuals.  
 Navigating through the referred definitions of foreign aid, it is clear that 
there is no consensus over what constitute foreign aid; however, there is 
agreement that foreign aid is a voluntary gift from a government to another 
country for the purpose of developing the recipient country. This aid can take 
different forms; thus, it can be in the form of cash (grants or concessional loans), 
or kind (food aid) or in the form of debt relief or technical assistance. This aid can 
be provided to fund activities like budgetary and balance of payment needs in the 
beneficiary country, the recipient countries investment projects and research 
activities, reform in political and economic sphere and humanitarian relief. Added 
to this, aid can be bilateral, when it is provided by one government to another 
government, or multilateral, when this aid is received by group of countries 
indirectly and through governmental organizations.   
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 Of these definitions, none is comprehensive enough to satisfy the author; 
however, DAC's definitions and that of Lancaster (2007) are worth considering as 
they emphasize that aid aims at improving human conditions and reduction of 
poverty, and that it should come from government. Despite that, they are not void 
of flaws. The fact that these definitions are largely driven and shaped by donor 
countries and their scholars, they do not represent the views of recipient countries 
and emerging donors who do not necessary apply these definitions to describe 
their aid allocation. For example Qatar does include financial aid provided by 
charitable organizations as part of its foreign aid. Added to this, these definitions 
make no mention of whether conditions are attached to aid, and whether both the 
donor and recipient countries benefit from aid. Finally, while these definitions 
partly depict the practice of aid giving, it does not describe the great innovation 
that has redefined the foreign aid giving since its outset in 1950s. This will be 
discussed in the following section. 
Historical Evolution of Foreign aid 
 Two fundamental developments have paved the way for the setting up 
foreign aid regime: the work of NGOs in early 1900s , and the establishment of 
welfare states in 1930s (Thérien, 2002). Before governments embark on extending 
hands to people abroad, such responsibility was shouldered by private aid in 
developed states. It was estimated that in 1910 developed countries were already 
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homes to over 300 NGOs active abroad.  Unlike contemporary NGOs, the works 
of the  1910 NGOs were initially concentrated on short-term humanitarian aid; 
however they  were gradually extended during the inter-war years to long-term 
development projects in the areas of health, education and agriculture (Thérien, 
2002).  The work of NGOs in international aid was boosted and expanded by the 
establishment of the welfare states in the 1930s and 1940s. As the welfare state 
legitimized government intervention to subside the harmful effects of the market, 
and to help in strengthening equality as a foundational principle of democracy, 
they embarked on similar projects abroad to supplement the works of NGOs 
(Thérien, 2002). To a large extent, foreign aid is a projection abroad of welfare 
state principles. It was in this context, British provided aid to its colonies acting 
under the Colonial Development and Welfare act of 1940 (Riddell, 2008).  These 
welfare principles were carried along to international organizations by member 
countries. Consequently, the notion of development aid became rooted in work of 
these organizations. For instance, in 1940s, International Labor Organization 
(ILO) called for aid in order to help it to ameliorate living standards in poor 
countries. Similarly, in 1943, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) started to receive funds from its member states to help 
and provide food, medicine and agricultural and industrial goods to more than 50 
countries (Riddell, 2008). 
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   Despite this, qualitative and quantitative transformations have occurred in 
aid disbursement due to structural changes in the international system, such as the 
rise of the US as hegemonic power in postwar world system, the Cold War, de-
colonization, the failure of the New International Economic Order and the 
acceleration of globalization. 
The end of the Second World War in favor of the US has enabled the US 
to strengthen its global presence through the use of foreign aid. Thus, as most of 
Europe was still in ruins, struggling to recover from the war, and in the face of 
Moscow's efforts to absorb East and Central Europe into the Soviet bloc, the US 
resorted to foreign aid as foreign policy tool to thwart the expansion of Soviet 
Union's influence in Europe. In this context, Washington acted through provision 
of economic assistance not only to stabilize regimes in Turkey and Greece, but 
also to enforce her presence in Europe. This move was followed by the Marshall 
Plan of four years 13 billion dollar aid program for the recovery of war-affected 
countries in other European countries (Lancaster, 2007). In the wake of the 
Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, the US also penetrated into Asian 
countries to preempt the Soviet Union to get a foothold in Asia.  Similar pretext 
aroused the US to extend her aid program to cover African countries amid Soviet 
presence there (Lancaster, 2007).  
The contest and the Cold-War rivalry between the West and Socialist bloc, 
and mini Cold War between US and the USSR, as to which represents the social 
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aspiration, contributed in significant expansion of aid distribution. In the heyday 
of growing rivalry between the US and USSR, and following the death of former 
Soviet Union leader Josef Starling in 1953, Moscow followed suit  by 
commencing its aid program amid the growing demands for aid to African and 
Asian countries in pursuit of its strategic interests. In 1960, socialist countries 
became important aid donors as both China and USSR spent $1.1 billion in aid 
(Lancaster, 2007).  
Although the European countries gained antecedence in giving aid in the 
decade and a half after the Second World War to their colonies in Africa and 
Caribbean, they became indifferent to provide aid to these countries after their 
independence. Thus, the rise of Socialist aspiration in Africa, and the European 
fright for their former colonies' association with the Soviet Union induced both 
France and Britain to recognize that they have no substitute but to provide large 
aid to facilitate the development of their colonies and to sustain the predominance 
of their influence (Van Der Veen, 2011).  Therefore, the French and British 
governments shifted away from the belief that newly independent states had to be 
self-financing; they have expanded their aid to these sates following the 
decolonization. 
While 1960s witnessed the massive establishment of new bilateral and 
multilateral aid institutions (like DAC of OECD, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development), this 
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expansion in aid institutions did not match with the sustained expansion of aid. 
However, at the close of 1960s towards the end of 1970, the failure of the New 
International Economic Order -which pushed nations into poverty-, has revived 
the discourse about aid and development (Riddell, 2007). Consequently, with the 
poverty and unemployment become more explicit, multilateral agencies, 
especially the World Bank, United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) geared up their efforts through financial aid to 
tackle poverty (Ibid). 
With the acceleration of globalization- hence interdependence, mobility of 
ideologies and people and technological advancement- the beliefs that 
underdevelopment and destitute status of the poor countries constitute a threat to 
the political, security and economic interests of donor countries, and that the 
battle for territories and colonies are now replaced by battle for minds and hearts 
of peoples contributed in the growth of foreign aid in relations between states. 
The US‟s aid to various Middle East countries, EU and DAC‟s aid programs to 
poor countries in Africa and Asia and the Arab Middle East countries‟ aid to 
African countries are more or less on this track. Moreover, the adoption of the 
Millennium Development Goals in 2000 was also geared towards the amelioration 
of the living standard and stimulation of economic development of developing 
countries (Van de Veen, 2011). 
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Overall, foreign aid has transformed significantly since its commencement 
in 1950s; structural changes in international context have been critical in this 
transformation. While foreign aid showed a step-change in response to the 
dynamics of international relations through its evolution, the question of why 
governments give aid is not adequately captured in this historical narration. The 
following section will discuss why governments give aid. 
Why Foreign Aid is Given? 
 The reason why governments give aid has been a subject of ideological 
difference between theorists of International Relations, notably between Realists, 
Liberals, Marxist and Constructivists scholars. For Realists, aid is nothing but a 
political tool exploited to amplify national interests. Their belief that states 
operate in an anarchical system wherein power, security and survival are their 
prime concern propelled them to argue that aid is a diplomatic tool. Therefore, 
according to this thesis, the default purpose of governments' disbursement of 
foreign aid is to enhance their national power and security (Liska, 1960; cited in 
Lancaster, 2007). Unlike the Realists, Liberalists believe that foreign aid reflect 
the willingness of states to cooperate in addressing problems of interdependence 
and globalization. Liberalists have drawn their conclusions from the amount of 
aid that was funneled through international institutions to combat infectious 
disease worldwide. To them, this suffices to argue that foreign aid is meant to 
 38 
 
expand cooperation between states in their collective efforts to address global 
issues (Lancaster, 2007).  
 In contrast to Liberalists and Realist, Marxists see foreign aid as an 
exploitive tool at the disposal of so-call capitalist countries. Their take on why 
governments give aid is found in dependency, postmodern and anti-globalization 
cousins. Thus, they make strong connection between the central world 
capitalism's disbursement of aid and their tendency to exploit and control 
developing countries. The fact that aid is sometimes goes with conditions or tying 
aid to export of goods and services from donors countries or securing access to 
raw materials in developing countries constitute an example of the exploitive 
nature of foreign aid practice (Lumsdain,1993).  
Last theorists who explains the rationale behind aid allocation is 
Constructivists. Like Liberalists, constructivists devoid foreign aid from any 
interest for the donor country; rather they believe that foreign aid is a 
manifestation of a norm that has developed in relations between states that rich 
countries should provide assistance to poor countries to ensure better quality of 
lives for poor nations (Lumsdain,1993). 
Away from the common theories in the realm of foreign aid, the religion 
of Islam gives explanation of why Muslims, be they countries or individuals, give 
aid to other Muslims. Since the early Islamic era and continuing through to the 
present, beneficent giving through Zakat and Waqf has been a core aspect of 
 39 
 
Muslim belief and practice. This is rooted in the religious precepts and ideals 
articulated in the Qur'an and the reports of the words and actions of the prophet 
Muhammad (hadith). The interpretive writings of Muslim scholars over the 
centuries have analyzed and elaborated the details of  this doctrine and 
practice(Singer, 2012). Aid giving, therefore, has been and continues to be an 
important factor in shaping Islamic societies and cultures. Without an 
appreciation of this fundamental aspect of Islam, it would be difficult to have a 
full understanding of Islamic societies, either in the past or in the present. By 
drawing on this, Islamic philanthropy and charity in Muslim society are 
fulfillment of obligation of helping poor be they individuals or countries. 
Therefore aid allocation by Muslim countries via NGOs or states is viewed in this 
context (Singer, 2012). This might explains why countries like Qatar consider aid 
giving by their charitable organizations as foreign aid.   
Broadly speaking, none of the theories explained above gives sufficient 
explanation of why foreign aid is provided. Each of these theories elucidates one 
aspect of multiple purposes that governments put into account when disbursing 
their scare resources to other nations. However, Realists and Marxists‟ arguments 
seem to be compatible, to some extent, with the practice of foreign aid, be they 
bilateral or multilateral aid. In today's world politics, hence the struggle over 
influence and power, aid that is being disbursed through regional and international 
institutions serve the collective interests of member states, or at least powerful 
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members for that matter. Thus the Liberalists and Constructivists‟ claims that aid 
reflect the cooperation between nations to address shared or poor countries 
problems is just is superficial motivation; the hidden motivation is actually found 
in the tenets of Realism and Marxism. The developmental loans that International 
Monetary Fund IMF and the Word Bank WB provide to African countries are tied 
with economic and political conditions of structural adjustment program and good 
governance requirement; this in its essence is imposition of certain values that are 
not necessary compatible with the historical and social contexts of the recipient 
countries. Moreover, the US aid to so-called confrontation zone in the Middle 
East, first and foremost is meant to neutralize security threats that may threaten 
US strategic interests in the region. Similarly, the recent humanitarian supports 
offered by the UK and the US to Ebola affected countries in the West Africa  is 
believed to be a pretext to control natural resource of these countries. This is even 
more acute when the colonial linkage between US and Liberia, and the UK and 
Sera Lion, and the initial deployment of troops instead of medical staff to these 
countries are considered. 
 Overall, regardless of theoretical disagreement over the purposes of 
foreign aid, in practice, foreign aid is disbursed to achieve one or more of the 
following purposes: 1- Diplomatic or political purposes: While this can serve 
other purposes (developmental purposes, humanitarian and cultural purposes), its 
default purpose is to manage the international relations of the donor country. It 
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involves international security and international political goals that a donor 
country pursues in its relations. For example, the US aid to support the Middle 
East peace process involves international security concern. 2-Development 
purpose: This aims at supporting economic and social development of recipient 
countries. Using aid to stimulate economic growth and to reduce poverty in 
developing world is apparent purposes of concessional loans that are provided by 
international institutions like IMF and the World Bank. 3-Humantarian purposes: 
Until 1940s, aid was disbursed by NGOs in response to critical situations that 
involve life of human beings. This type of aid is still prominent in the activities of 
NGOs that work in poor countries that frequently lack necessary resources to 
accommodate the needs of disaster victims. The International Red Cross 
Organizations, Oxfam and other local based NGOs‟ works fall in this category. 4- 
Commercial purposes: This includes using aid to expand the donor country's 
exports or to secure access to raw materials in recipient countries. China and 
Japan aid to Africa typically bend to serve these purposes. 5- Cultural purposes: 
this involves the use of aid to promote culture of the donor country through 
education; or to strengthen and expand particular religious belief in the recipient 
countries. Charitable organizations from the Arab Middle East countries are 
famous in this domain.  
While these five purposes are not the exhausted purposes, they explain, to 
a great extent, the rationale behind aid allocation by many countries.  
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Navigating through the historical development, it becomes obvious that 
foreign aid, as it stands today, has been an effective, yet a controversial foreign 
policy tool. While its exploitation in international relations was initially restricted 
to capitalist and socialist as well as communist camps, the swift of power from the 
North to South has accompanied the emergence of new donors in middle income 
countries of the South. Thus, foreign aid becomes a dominant tool in south-south 
cooperation. One part of the world where foreign aid has a momentum is the 
Arabian Gulf. In light of their limited foreign policy tool, and with abundant oil 
revenues, these countries‟ foreign policy towards developing countries is 
facilitated by foreign aid. Qatar as emerging and ambitious small Gulf state is 
outstanding in this respect. In the following chapter, I present how this naturally 
gas-rich country exploits its economic edge to manage its relations with world in 
general, and with Africa in particular. 
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Chapter Two 
Qatar Foreign Policy towards Africa: Strategies 
and Tactics -1971-2013 
Since its independence, Qatar has been a small power among the biggest 
countries. With narrow vision of foreign policy ambition Qatar remained behind 
Saudi Arabia to lead the regional policy throughout 1970s and 1980s. The recent 
surge in Qatar foreign policy is attributed to the ascendancy of Sheikh Hamad Bin 
Khalif Al-Thani to the throne through a bloodless coup in 1995. Sheikh Hamad's 
awareness about the limitation of Qatar‟s location, and his appreciation of how he 
can neutralize this limitation and constraints to remain independent guided him in 
projecting Qatar foreign policy objectives (Roberts, 2012a). Qatar engagement 
with the US is driven by this principle. While America remains the main protector 
of Qatar, the later diversifies its dependency to maintain independent action. 
Towards this direction, Sheikh Hamad made good use of Qatar energy nexus to 
lure countries like Britain, China and Japan to be concern about Qatar security 
and to be ready to protect Qatar for the sake of their energy security (Roberts, 
2012b) . In the MENA region, Qatar pursued proactive foreign policy to place 
itself in a prominent position in the regional politics; this ambition is extended to 
include Africa where Qatar exploited different foreign policy instruments to 
 44 
 
create for itself a favorable environment for its investments and to get political 
weight through its humanitarian work(Woertz, Pradhan, Biberovic, & Jingzhon, 
2008). 
In the context of discussion of how the Arab Spring might have changed 
Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa; this chapter borrows from Foreign Policy 
Change Approach
3
 to understand factors that have determined changes in Qatar 
foreign policy tactics and strategies in relation to its engagement with Africa. It 
will be shown that changes that occurred in Qatar foreign policy tactics and 
strategies are driven by changes in leadership and in regional structure. While 
these changes have significant impacts on tactics (methods or instruments) of 
Qatar foreign policy towards Africa; it could not bring similar changes in Qatar 
foreign policy strategies. Thus, despite the evolution of Qatar‟s foreign policy 
tactics- which now include foreign aid, mediation and humanitarian work-, Qatar 
                                                 
3
 Foreign Policy Change Approach explains notion of changes in relations to foreign 
policy. According to this approach foreign policy changes comprises two main types of 
changes: Tactical and Strategic. While tactical changes is refereed to  shift within the 
framework of policies that focuses on  method and instruments, strategic changes is 
refereed to  fundamental shifts in  foreign policy goal and the state position in 
international system. This approach identified three factors that are considered as sources 
of changes in foreign policy. these include (1) changes in individuals or leadership 
(foreign policy changes due to cognitive and motivational psychology of individuals or 
leaders); (2) changes in state institutions, domestic and regional structure (domestic and 
regional structure provide clues to the possibilities of changes and obstacles to changes 
within a given polity); (3) changes in political regimes (state moving from democratic to 
authoritarian regime changes foreign policy of that state).  
While these three factors are worth examining in the case of Qatar, a close 
examination of Qatar foreign policy since independent in 1971 indicates that the most 
relevant factors that brought changes to Qatar foreign policy are leadership changes and 
changes in regional structure. To this end, these two factors are selected to examine their 
effects on Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies (Alden &Aran, 2012) 
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foreign policy strategies in Africa remained revolved- to a great extent -around 
pursuing immediate political, economic and cultural objectives. Therefore, 
moving towards long-term strategic political and security cooperation between 
Qatar and African countries remains in the footnote of Qatar policy strategies in 
Africa. In this, Qatar shows no difference from overall stands of the GCC foreign 
policies towards Africa.  
To further discuss this argument, the first part of the chapter focuses on 
the impacts of leadership changes and regional structure on the source of changes 
to Qatar foreign policy in general; the second part is dedicated to examine how 
these two factors have determined Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies in 
Africa from 1970s to 2013. 
 Qatar Foreign Policy: Strategies and Tactics 
 
A close examination of Qatar foreign policy, form its independence to 
2013, two factors have been instrumental in bringing changes in Qatar foreign 
policy strategies and tactics; these include changes in structure of the regional 
system, and leadership changes.   
1- Structure of Regional power and Qatar Foreign policy-1970s to 
1990s 
Changes in Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies have been linked to 
power structure that prevailed in the Gulf and the Middle East regions from 1970s 
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to 1980s. In light of this prevailing regional structure personalized in the vacuum 
of power created by the British departure and regional instability brought by the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, Arab Israel conflict, Iran-Iraq War and Iraq invasion 
of Kuwait , Qatar foreign policy strategies remained centered on maintaining the 
status quos at regional and domestic levels and promoting Arab unity. These 
strategies reflected the strategic priorities shared by other Gulf countries(Roberts, 
2012a). Such common foreign policy approach was necessitated by political 
instability at regional level. Under these regional turbulences, Qatar did not 
conduct its foreign policy independently; rather it counted on Riyadh for direction 
in policy matters and in terms of basic security. Thus, from the end of 1970s to 
early 1990s, Qatar followed the typical foreign policy decisions taken by other 
Gulf countries and it pursued no unconventional or odd policies which Qatar has 
recently become so famous for(Roberts, 2012a).  
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 has provoked Gulf regimes and intensified 
their sense of insecurity in the middle of vacuum of power left by the British. 
Thus, the perceived threat of the contagion of the Khomeini brand of Islamic 
fundamentalism and his commitment to export the revolution to countries in the 
Persian Gulf propelled the Gulf States to embark on a steady build-up hoping to 
maintain the status quos and offset the Iranian threats. The coordination of the 
Gulf States' foreign policies in the face of these threats has culminated in the 
establishment of the GCC in 1980(F. G. I. Gause, 1994).  
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Similar to the threats of the Iranian revolution, the Iraq-Iran War has 
consumed foreign policy orientation of the Gulf States, including Qatar, in terms 
of time and resources. The belief that this war was a natural response to the 
threats of Iran‟s Islamic revolution necessitated regular cash infusion, stood 
approximately at 40 billion, from the Gulf states, along with other forms of aid to 
help Iraq in containing Iran's threats to maintain regional stability(Gause III, 
1999) 
While the GCC states‟ supports of Iraq should have created an opportunity for 
future cooperation between Iraq and the GCC states, Iraq has surprised its Gulf 
neighbors when it invaded Kuwait in 1990. Not only did this war increase sense 
of insecurity within the GCC states, it has also consumed foreign policy efforts of 
the GCC states. However, The US led liberation of Kuwait from Saddam Hussein 
in 1991 not only diluted the Iraqi threats, but it has also provided vital comfort to 
a small but wealthy countries like Qatar to feel less reliant on Saudi Arabia for 
their protection as the US became the main protector of its regional allies 
including Qatar (F. G. Gause & III, 2009). 
In addition to maintaining regional stability, Arab unity was a core strategy of 
Qatar foreign policy. This was reflected in the Gulf general stand towards Arab-
Israel conflict. Collectively, Gulf States voted for anti-Israeli steps and they were 
willing to concede that they had an economic obligation towards the 
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Palestinians(Rosman-Stollman, 2004). During the October War in 1973, the Gulf 
States collectively refused to sell oil to states supporting Israel in a boycott 
initiated by Saudi Arabia. Following the Camp David Accords of September 
1978, Qatar joined other Gulf States to isolate Egypt diplomatically; this 
demonstrated the centrality of the Arab unity in Qatar foreign policy objectives 
(Rosman-Stollman, 2004). 
Whereas Qatar pursued regional stability, the ensuring of regime survival and 
promoting Arab unity as its foreign policy goals and strategies during 1970s and 
1980s, it was bent upon mix of foreign aid, economic boycotts and diplomatic 
isolation as foreign policy tactics and instruments to reach the stated foreign 
policy strategies. In maintaining regional stability and survival of the monarchical 
regimes, Qatar employed coordinated diplomacy and foreign aid to contain the 
Iranian and Iraqi threats to the status quo. The same instruments were used to 
support Arab causes in Arab-Israel war; these were supplemented by economic 
boycotts against countries that sympathized with Israel, and diplomatic isolation 
as it happened with Egypt in 1973. 
2- Leadership Change, the Arab Spring and Qatar Proactive Foreign 
Policy-1995-2013  
While the prevalent power structure in the Gulf regional system guided Qatar 
foreign policy to remain in harmony with that of its Gulf neighbors in the quest of 
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maintaining the regional stability, the decades that followed 1990s showed 
significant changes in strategies and tactics of Qatar foreign policy (Peterson, 
2013). Although the fade of Iran‟s threats of exporting the revolution, the end of 
Iraq-Iran war and containment of Saddam‟s threats by UN sanctions were 
partially accounted for these substantial changes, the combination of leadership 
change and changes in the power structure of the Middle East in the wake of the 
Arab Spring are largely accounted for these changes.  
a- Sheikh Hamad the Pioneer of Qatar Foreign Policy 
The emergence of Qatar‟s power and influence in the Gulf region and the 
Middle East at large is largely ascribed to the small state‟s foreign policy activism 
formulated by Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani during seventeenth years of his 
Emeriship (From 1995 to 2013). With the support of his charismatic wife, 
Shaikha Moza bint Nasser al-Misnad, and his Prime Minister Sheikh Jasim bin 
Hamad Al-Thani , Sheik Hamamd crafted an innovative foreign policy for his 
country that shifted Qatar‟s foreign policy agenda away from his father‟s 
acquiescence to Saudi hegemony in the region (Cooper & Momani, n.d.). Sheikh 
Hamad‟s belief that Qatar needed to fundamentally change its position to become 
a leading, moderate and internationally-focused country guided him to expand 
Qatar foreign policy strategies beyond the traditional one. Consequently, while 
maintaining regional stability, ensuring regime survival and promoting Arab unity 
remained among the core strategies of Qatar foreign policy, Qatar- under the 
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leadership of Sheikh Hamad- has strategized its foreign policy to foster a 
reputation for itself as indispensable and different type of regional and 
international actor. This strategy has, in many instances, conflicted with strategies 
pursued by Qatar with its Gulf and Arab neighbors at regional and international 
levels. 
In pursuance of this new foreign policy strategies, Sheikh Hamad 
exploited Qatar‟s abundant natural resources to lure world powers and emerging 
economies to be concerned about Qatar economy and security and make them feel 
about Qatar presence as important strategic partner in the Middle East (Roberts, 
2012a). In this direction, Qatar has developed a long-term strategic partnership 
with the US through security arrangement to offset geopolitical threats that it may 
face. The Constructing of the US airbase facility in Al-Udaid in 1996 -which 
came as materialization of this arrangement- was viewed as Qatar‟s efforts not 
only to entice the US away from its Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia, but 
also to provide protection for Doha as it embark on its proactive foreign policy 
(Roberts, 2012a). On the other hand, Qatar made itself indispensable to some of 
the world‟s most important actors by selling large amounts of gas to key countries 
such as the UK, China, Japan and India (Roberts, 2012a). 
Beyond the engagement with the West and the rising economies of Asia as 
indispensable partner, Qatar sought to carve out the image of different actor in the 
Middle East region. The launch of Al Jazeera in 1995, as the Arab world‟s first 
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all-news satellite television network, was one way of Doha‟s efforts to foster its 
reputation in the region as different actor. In addition of being a tool for 
legitimizing Qatar foreign policy relations and carving out a favorable image for 
itself as indispensable international and regional actor, Al-Jazeera has been 
critical about policies of number of Arab governments. This has led many 
countries, including Iran, Iraq, Israel and Saudi Arabia, to sanction Al-Jazeera in 
some ways (Khatib, 2013). Additionally, Qatar has become the preferred 
destination for many political dissents in the region. In this regard, Doha harbored 
the region unwelcome political figures like Hamas‟s Khaled Misel and leaders of 
Muslim Brotherhood from Syria and Egypt, some of whom have been granted 
Qatari citizenship. The discomfort and displeasure of Doha‟s international and 
regional allies to Doha‟s granting of asylum to these dissents confirmed Qatar 
efforts to foster its reputation as a unique actor (Peterson, 2013).   
Similarly, Qatar‟s determination to present itself as distinctive actor 
escorted Qatar to maintain balanced diplomacy. While Qatar has friendly relations 
with Israel and the United States, it also maintained strong relations with regional 
„pariah states‟ and stated enemies of the United States: Syria and Iran. Qatar has 
also donated money to Hamas and Hezbollah, both plain enemies of Israel, 
classified as terrorist groups by the United States and other Western 
states(Roberts, 2012b). On the other hand, although Arab unity remained vivid as 
one Qatar foreign policy strategies, Qatar has taken foreign policy decisions that 
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are confirmed to be antithetical to Arab unity. For example, while Qatar remained 
loyal to collective Arabs‟ stand toward Arab-Israel conflict, Qatar maintained 
informal relations with Israel. In this regard, Qatar and Israel commenced quiet 
business relations in 1996. In that same year, Qatar established its first trade 
office in Israel and the Israelis opened their second office in Doha. Qatar 
commercial relations with Israel is not the only incidence that questioned Qatar 
loyalty to Arab cause(Roberts, 2012a). In 2006, Qatar defied the Arab League 
consensus by refusing to vote for Jordan‟s Prince Zeid for the post of UN 
Secretary General and instead supported South Korea‟s Ban Ki Moon. 
Additionally, despite that most of the Gulf States preserved to show open 
relations with Iran, Qatar remained close friend of Iran. In 2007 Qatar invited 
Iran‟s Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting, to 
the dismay of both regional and world leaders. Subsequently, Qatar used its 2006–
07 UN Security Council seat to defy the United States by disagreeing to pressure 
Iran on nuclear proliferation in 2006 (Roberts, 2012a). 
The above instances in Qatar foreign policy behaviors confirmed the 
occurrence of qualitative changes in Qatar foreign policy strategies since the 
ascendancy of Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani. The dynamics of politics 
personalized in the Arab Spring has also expanded Qatar foreign strategies in the 
Middle East region. 
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b- Qatar Foreign Policy amid changes in the power structure of the Middle 
East 
The consumption of foreign and domestic policies of Middle East traditional 
heavyweight
4
 by the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 has given rise in the 
influence of countries like Qatar. Thus, in light of the vacuum of power in the 
Middle East, Qatar strategized its foreign policy to occupy the vacant leadership 
position of the Middle East. In this context, Qatar pursued high profile and 
proactive diplomacy; hence, it has been active in supporting the people in Arab 
Spring countries. Through its proactive foreign policy, it was able to put an end to 
Qhaddafi‟s regime in Libya; it led regional and international efforts to isolate 
Bashar Assad of Syria; it supported and influenced in Egypt revolution; it helped 
Egypt Muslim brotherhood to win the Egyptian elections and it actively supported 
Islamic parties of Tunis to strengthen their grip on power in Tunis. In the Middle 
of this self-assigning leadership role, Doha became central pivot for hosting 
political and diplomatic conferences as it hosted various talks on Libya and Syria 
crises(Colombo, 2012). 
With regard to Qatar foreign policy tactics, not only did Qatar foreign policy 
strategies change as the result of changes in leadership and structure of power in 
the Middle East; rather the tactics and instruments Qatar employed to pursue these 
                                                 
4
 Damascus, Riyadh, Cairo and Baghdad have political, economic and diplomatic 
significance of Middle East political, economic, military and ideological power base.  
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strategies have shown profound changes. While foreign aid was familiar foreign 
policy tactics since 1970s, this instrument was supplemented by an array of wide 
ranges of new tactics. Prominent among them is public diplomacy. In this regard, 
Qatar used its financial clout to host multilateral conferences. For example, it 
hosted the largest conference on United Nations Convention on Climate change 
from 26
th
 of November to 6
th
 of December 2012. Qatar also aggressively and 
successfully used sport as part of its public diplomacy strategy. In 2006 it 
successfully hosted the XV Asian Games; and has just won the bid to host the 
2022 World Cup amidst allegation of corruption and human rights violations 
which persisted to threaten  or undermine this unprecedented 
accomplishment(Antwi-Boateng, 2013).  
Foreign aid and humanitarian assistance are yet other foreign policy strategies 
that Qatar utilizes to yield its strategies. In addition its regular aid flow to 
countries Middles East, Asia and African countries, Qatar provided $100 million 
dollars assistance to the U.S in the wake of a devastating natural disaster of 
Katrina(Antwi-Boateng, 2013). 
Additionally, Qatar involved itself in mediation process and it has proved to 
be one of the world‟s most proactive mediators and a neutral peacemaker in many 
of the international and intra-national conflicts brewing across the Middle East 
region(Kamrava, 2011b). Surprisingly, the Arab Spring has allowed Qatar to 
consider military intervention to pursue its foreign policy strategy. In this regard, 
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Qatar intervened in Libya along with NATO forces to overthrow Qaddafi‟s 
regime(Khatib, 2013). 
Explaining Qatar Foreign Policy Tactics and Strategies in Africa 
 
1- Regional Turbulences and Qatar Foreign Policy towards Africa 
 
Qatar foreign policy towards Africa is relatively new and dates to 1971 
when Qatar completely took over its foreign policy after the departure of Britain. 
However, the connection between Qatar and Africa- which is echoed in the 
context of the Gulf socio-economic linkage with Africa- predated 1970s. The 
Gulf-African connection dates back to earliest days of humanity‟s spread around 
the world (Peel & Peel, 2013). In those days, relations between the two regions 
were tied to the movement of people and goods which has resulted in the 
settlement of large diasporas communities in both regions. In seventh century, 
these relations further strengthened through the spread of Islam in Africa and the 
subsequent annual migration of Africans to Mecca for pilgrimage (Wai, 2014). 
However, this socio-economic relation was de-linked with the ascendancy of 
European in Africa that disrupted slave trade which was massively practiced by 
Omani Empire in Eastern Africa from 1600s to 1800s(Wai, 2014). 
Notwithstanding this, the struggles of 1950s to 1970s‟ liberalization movements 
in Africa and the Arab Israel war have re-connected the Gulf countries and 
Africans; these two developments were determinant factors that pushed Arabs in 
 56 
 
general and Africans to exchange diplomatic supports and cooperation which 
were required for the solving of their common concerns (Talbot, & Wallace, 
2006). It was under shadow of this Arab-African cooperation the Gulf-African 
relations evolved in early 1960s to the end of 1970s. 
Although Qatar was an emerging independent state during the heydays of 
the Gulf-African relations, the Arab search for diplomatic supports from African 
countries in their war with Israel has inspired Qatar along with other Gulf 
countries  ( notably oil producing countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates) to provide financial supports to developing countries in Africa 
(Hunter, 1984). This marked the beginning of Qatar foreign policy towards 
Africa, which reflected the overall policy strategic priories of the Gulf in Africa. 
Thus, Qatar did not pursue independent foreign policy approach towards Africa 
from 1970s to 1990s; neither the tactics nor the strategies of its foreign policy 
were different from that of the Gulf States.  
In the context of the Arab-Israel conflict, the quadrupling of oil prices in 
1973- made foreign aid available for foreign policy tactics to Gulf States for use 
in their pursuit of specific national interests in Africa. The nature of Afro-Arab 
cooperation determined that political interests take precedence over economic, 
humanitarian and religious considerations for both bilateral and multilateral aid. 
Thus, Qatar foreign policy strategies in Africa was linked to the pursuance of 
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political supports from African countries between 1973 and 1980( Williams, 
2011). 
The decade that followed 1970s has witnessed a setback in Qatar foreign 
policy towards Africa due to the wane of Arab-Israel conflict after the Camp 
David agreement in 1978, but also more importantly due to regional crisis in the 
Gulf which were personalized in Iranian revolution, Iraq-Iran war and Iraq 
invasion of Kuwait. The 1978 Camp David agreement which marked an end to 
enduring Arab- Israel conflict has reduced political significance of Africa in the 
eyes of the Gulf States as they could not justify their engagement with Africans in 
light of irrelevance of gaining African support for the Arab Israel conflict after the 
peace deal between Israel and Egypt. The periphery of Africa in the foreign policy 
of the Gulf States deepened further as the results of Iran Revolution, Iraq-Iran 
War and Iraq invasion of Kuwait. These regional developments prompted the 
Gulf States to be preoccupied with regional and domestic security concerns as 
well as establishment of the regional bloc, the GCC (Boos, 2008). 
Notwithstanding the relative pause in the Gulf political engagement with 
Africa during 1980s and early 1990s, this period witnessed the whetting of Gulf 
States‟ religious interests in Africa as a result of  Saudi-Iranian competition over 
leadership of Muslim world in the aftermath of Iranian revolution(Amirahmadi, 
1993), and due to the post-independent religiously motivated conflicts in Africa, 
in which Gulf countries are perceived to have supported Muslims in these 
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conflicts (Akinsanya, 2010)
5. Thus, during 1980s, Qatar‟s aid were distributed 
through bilateral organizations like the Muslim League and Multilateral Islamic 
financial institutions like Islamic Development Bank to provide aid to Africa 
Muslim countries for economic and social development projects, social welfare 
programmers, educational and cultural activities and religious-oriented projects 
and activities ( Williams, 2011). 
In sum, the fact that Qatar did not develop independent foreign policy 
approach towards Africa from early 1970s to the first half of 1990s did not 
necessary mean that Qatar was irrelevant in the middle of the Gulf state‟s 
engagement with Africa. Rather, Qatar foreign policy tactics and strategies 
remained highly linked to overall Gulf foreign policy priorities. Thus, beside 
political interests, Gulf countries employed their financial clout to pursue 
religious interests in Africa during the period of 1970s to 1990s. The events of 
Arab-Israel conflict, the Iranian revolution, Iraq-Iran war and Iraq invasion of 
Kuwait were determinant in defining these strategies and tactics.  
2- Leadership Change and Whetting of Qatar Interests in Africa 
Undoubtedly, the relief of the Gulf region from the regional crises of Iranian 
revolution and two Gulf Wars has contributed in widening the scope of Qatar 
foreign policy activities; however the concurrent leadership change in 1995 
accounted for the qualitative changes in tactics and strategies of Qatar foreign 
                                                 
5
 Especially in Chad, Ethiopia and Eretria. 
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policy towards Africa. Since his ascendancy to power, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa 
Al-Thani realized the vulnerability of Qatar which stems from its dependence on 
food importation in light of lack of arable lands for agricultural investments; its 
dependence on hydrocarbon extraction particularly natural gas to drive its 
economy;  and its small territorial size and small population size as well as 
relative military force. Out of the necessity to protect its sovereignty and 
international interests, Hamad has developed a seemingly unique foreign policy to 
weather Qatar vulnerability (Roberts, 2012a). This has brought Africa to Qatar‟s 
foreign policy attention, and it has determined its foreign policy strategies in 
Africa and tactics it employs to reach these strategies. 
In Qatar‟s quest for food security and diversification of its economy, it 
employed the combination of economic and political tactics to achieve food 
security and diversification of its economy. On the one hand, it has depended on 
foreign aid to create favorable environments for its investments and land 
purchases in the recipient countries. This is evident in the East Africa where, by 
virtue of its geographical proximity to Qatar, has been the hotspot for Qatar land 
purchases and investments within Africa (Jason, 2010). Qatar agro-investment in 
East Africa becomes necessary when it is considered that Qatar imports 90% of 
its food from around the world, (Brazil, the Philippines, Australia and Saudi 
Arabia to name just a few suppliers). The reliance on these limited external actors 
for food security has been disadvantageous for Qatar. The lengths of the routes 
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that food takes to reach Qatar make it vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. In the 
event of conflict in the region, food supply could be choked off at the Strait of 
Hormuz; it could be choked off at its border with Saudi Arabia and the larger, 
more militarized states in the region could choke off air supplies of food to Qatar 
as well (Jason, 2010). Consequently, the interest of protecting itself from 
catastrophe, Qatar aligns itself with multiple actors in East Africa to diversify 
sources of its food security. For example Hassad Food, one of the five 
subsidiaries of Qatar Sovereign Fund and which current strategy focuses on 
investing in existing agricultural business and exporting the products to Qatar, 
began acquiring farmland for agribusiness in Africa. In 2009, Qatar purchased 
250,000 hectares of land in the Sudan (Hassad Food 2009) and 400,000 in Kenya 
(Makutsa 2010,).  
In the realm of economic diversification, Qatar Petroleum (QP) and its 
international subsidiary QPI are exploiting on the African continent. For example 
QPI has a share subscription to 15% of Total E&P Congo (TEPC) relating to nine 
producing assets and three exploration licenses in the country (Energy Boardroom 
2014; Tuttle 2013). Moreover, Qatar National Bank‟s QNB has made a largest 
initial entry into Africa by investing in the Togo-based Ecobank Transnational 
Inc. QNB became the largest shareholder with 23.5 percent stake after making 
two separate purchases of 12.5% followed by a second 11% purchase (Sharif and 
Tuttle 2014).  
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In addition to food security and diversification of economy purposes, Qatar‟s 
inherent vulnerability as a small state in a turbulent region has forced its leaders to 
present the state as a neutral entity that is willing to work with all sides(Roberts, 
2012a). This has reflected in its foreign policy strategies and tactics in Africa. 
Through mediation, humanitarian assistance and foreign aid Qatar has been trying 
to secure strong foothold in various African countries. In relation to mediation, 
Qatar has experienced mediating conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and part of 
that negotiation included financial support for development projects in these 
countries(Kamrava, 2011b).  
With regards to humanitarian assistance, in Mali and Central Africa, the 
Qatari Red Crescent and Qatar Charity have recently been active in supporting 
refugees and coordinating humanitarian interventions in these countries (Khatib, 
2013). The willingness to get out in front of a conflict and show commitment as 
an outside entity by putting your own resources to bear to promote the prospect of 
peace has the potential to carry political weight for Qatar. However, it remains to 
be seen how this will yield the intended results for Qatar given the complexities 
within African societies in terms of the diversity of peoples, ethnicities and 
religions that sometimes clash. This is even more acute when one considers 
Ethiopian accusation of Qatar for bias towards Eritrea which culminated in 
diplomatic row between Qatar and Ethiopia. Additionally, Qatar humanitarian 
activities in the North of Mali has sparked rumors that Qatar is using 
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humanitarian missions as an excuse to send weapons to Arab armed groups in 
northern Mali(Khatib, 2013). This allegation tends to prove the assumption that 
Qatar‟s tendency to align with Islamic group in the Middle East is reflected in its 
activities in Africa. While it is difficult to verify this allegation, what remains 
clear is that Qatar humanitarian work is limited to African Muslim countries, or 
regions populated by Muslims. This confirmed that Qatar uses humanitarian 
activities as foreign policy tactics to promote Islam and support Muslims.  
Generally Qatar foreign policy has witnessed profound changes in terms 
of strategies and tactics; these changes were driven by changes in leadership and 
dynamics of politics at regional level. While the turbulent  nature of the Gulf 
region and the Middle East overall has determined that Qatar pursued regional 
stability as focus of its foreign policy strategies, the leadership changes in 1995 
has expanded the scope and the scale of Qatar foreign policy to include carving 
out an image of indispensable and different actor. The vacuum of power that was 
created by the Arab Spring whetted Qatar ambition of regional leadership. The 
innovative foreign policy of Qatar is also mirrored in its engagement in Africa. 
While the regional crises limited Qatar foreign policy strategies in Africa to the 
pursuance of political and religious interests from 1970s to 1980s; such strategic 
has extended to include economic, political and religious interests following the 
leadership change. However, the qualitative changes in Qatar foreign policy 
tactics are not reflected in foreign policy strategies. Thus, strategies of 
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cooperation between Qatar and African countries in political and security spheres 
remain periphery in Qatar foreign policy strategy.  
While foreign aid was used as an instrument in Qatar foreign policy 
approach to Africa, what remains unclear is that whether the recent regional 
turbulence personalized in the Arab Spring will increase or decrease the flow of 
Qatar aid to Africa in the pursuance of its different economic, political and 
regions strategies. The following chapter will provide answers to this question. 
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Chapter Three 
The Arab Spring and Changes in Qatar Foreign 
Aid to Africa 
The hyper activism in Qatar foreign policy in the reign of the former Emir, 
Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, was convoyed with parallel activism in the 
range of foreign policy instruments labored by the small rich Gulf state to 
advance its national and regional ambitions. Prominent among these instruments 
is foreign aid. The past ten years was prosperous moment for the large scale use 
of foreign aid in Qatar foreign policy (Kamrava, 2013). Until this period, Qatar 
primarily accounted on traditional diplomacy to manage its foreign policy with 
the wider world. In contrast to its rich neighbors of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates, which have their national agencies for the administration 
of their foreign aid, little was known or noted about Qatar involvement in foreign 
aid business apart from its contribution to multilateral aid institutions at regional 
and international levels. However, with the Emirship of Sheikh Hamad in 1995, 
Qatar used its financial hedge to explore the world of foreign aid hence it became 
an emerging Arab aid donor; resultantly, foreign aid is being enveloped in Qatar 
foreign policy and it became as part and parcel in its instrument. In this regard, 
not only did the geographical coverage of Qatar development assistance stops at 
its immediate neighbors in the Middle East region, rather it has surpassed the 
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Middle East regional boundary to cover continents of Asia, Europe, America and 
Africa(Antwi-Boateng, 2013). 
With regards to Africa, the revival of the Gulf- African ties and the 
emergence of Africa as target destination for Gulf agricultural production and 
capital investment permitted wide ranges of Africa countries to be considered by 
Qatar in its foreign aid allocations. Similarly, Qatar humanitarian operation has 
also stormed the continent, and wherever Qatar could spot potential political, 
religious and economic opportunities in the continent, its charitable organizations 
supplement governmental efforts to turn those opportunities into its interests.   
In light of the eruption of the Arab Spring and the consequent upward and 
downward of Qatar foreign policy trend, this chapter presents changes that 
occurred in the architecture of Qatar foreign aid in general, and the reflection of 
these changes in Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa. However, the first part of the 
chapter briefly examines Qatar foreign aid in terms of institutions that are active 
in the management of this complex business of the government. The remaining 
part of the chapter demonstrates findings in relations to changes in the pattern of 
Qatar foreign aid allocation from 2010 to 2013. In the final section of the chapter, 
the discussion will revolve around the extent to which the Arab Spring has shaped 
Qatar foreign aid in general and the flow of this aid to Africa in particular.  
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Qatar Foreign Aid Donors: Government and its Partners 
 
In a sharp contrast to the concepts of foreign aid, which restrict the 
definitions of foreign aid to resources disbursed by governments, what is 
considered as foreign aid in Qatari context is not exclusively a jurisdiction of the 
government. The Qatari government along with considerable number of charitable 
organizations and foundations operate coordinately to project political and 
economic interests of the state of Qatar through foreign aid disbursement. The 
envelopment of NGOs in Qatar foreign aid is officially recognized by the state of 
Qatar in its report about its external assistance: 
“Qatar foreign aid contains the details of external assistance offered by 
the government and people of Qatar to the peoples and governments of the world, 
via official donor bodies, charitable associations and institutions, and 
humanitarian organizations, which have contributed generously to reduce the 
suffering of victims of national disasters and humanitarian crises. The 
government and people of Qatar have provided grants and donations to 
governments, organizations and individuals, through a framework of development 
cooperation with these countries and organizations, which have applied for 
donations and assistance in various aspects of reconstruction and sustainable 
development” (Foreign Aid Report 2010-2011; p.18).  Thus institutions that 
disburse Qatar foreign aid include the government ministries and charitable 
organizations and institutions. 
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1- The Government 
Foreign Ministry of the State of Qatar is the focal agent in managing Qatar 
foreign aid. The International Cooperation Department at the ministry, which was 
tasked as the central body for such activities since 2010,  is directly in charge of 
compiling and monitoring all government and non-government Qatari external 
assistance. The department is also tasked with the preparation of periodic and 
annual reports on Qatar‟s external assistance (Foreign Aid Report 2010-2011; 
p.19). 
Apparently, the Emir Diwan and Ministry of Finance and Economy are 
also believed to engage, along with Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the 
disbursement of Qatar foreign aid. However, due to the secrecy and lack of 
accountability and transparency in relations to the public fund management in the 
Gulf in general and in Qatar in particular verification of the pattern of this aid 
disbursement is of a hard task. Despite this, coordination is believed to exist 
between these three governmental bodies in overseeing some of the outstanding 
financial commitments obligations made by the state of Qatar. These include the 
State of Qatar‟s commitment of QR 912.5 million in 2009 during the Gulf donors‟ 
conference in Riyadh to the reconstruction  of Gaza; the State of Qatar‟s 
commitment  at the New York conference of 2010 to the reconstruction of Haiti  
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with QR 73 million; Qatar's commitment of supporting the Comoros Island with a 
payment of QR 113 million; Qatar grant of QR 365 million to Japan following the 
Tohoku earthquake in Japan and Qatar‟s commitment and grants of billions of 
dollars to various countries of the Arab Spring during 2011 to 2014 (Foreign Aid 
Report 2010-2011; p.10). 
In addition to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Emir Diwan and Ministry of 
Finance and Economy, Ministry of Endowment and Islamic Affairs via General 
Directorate of Endowments (Awqaf) and Zakat Fund are other donors that 
disburse Qatar external aid. These two institutions operate under the directives of 
the ministry, and their operations go beyond the territory of Qatar. For example, 
the General Directory of Endowment spends millions of Qatari Riyals annually to 
fund several educational and social projects and religious programs in Europe, 
Asia and Africa. In this regard, it has funded the construction of Maifar Islamic 
Center in Manchester UK, and it has also built Islamic Center in Croatia as well 
as other small scale programs in Africa and Asia (Website of Awqaf). 
2- Charity Institutions and Humanitarian Organizations 
Qatar charity institutions and humanitarian organizations are indispensable 
partners of Qatar government in the aid business. These humanitarian 
organizations engage in humanitarian and development issues at regional and 
international levels. They are also involved in crisis and natural disasters, and they 
are active in a number of vital sectors and areas. There relations to the 
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government of Qatar rest in that fact that these bodies receive government‟s 
support or assistance with their programs and projects as well as budgetary 
support from the state. Moreover their external projects, in terms of recipient 
countries and the type of the project, are determined by the policy framework set 
by the government to project national interests of the state. This is evident more in 
the cases of Qatar Charity and Qatar Red Crescent which are regarded as the 
extension of the state apparatus. In addition to funds they receive from the 
government, these charities also collect funds from individuals in the forms of 
charity and donation. These institutions and organizations include:  
a- Qatar Charitable Society 
The Qatar Charitable Society was established in 1992 based on the law 
governing private associations and institutions in the State of Qatar. Its activities 
spread to cover 45 countries located throughout the world, particularly in Africa 
and Asia. In these continents, Charitable Society cooperates with more than 150 
accredited local associations. Qatar Charitable Society is funded by donors, 
revenues from Islamic trusts (waqfs) and local investments; however, it also 
benefits at times from government supports to implement development projects in 
the framework of bilateral cooperation between Qatar and friendly states. 
Additionally, there are revenues available from partnerships and cooperation with 
certain donor parties, such as investment banks and agencies, and specialized UN 
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organizations. The average budget of the QCS is around QR 292 million (Foreign 
Aid Report 2010-2011). 
 
b- Sheikh Eid Charity Institute 
The Sheikh Eid bin Mohamed Al Thani Charity Institute was established in 
November 1995 to offer aid and services to victims of natural disasters, and to 
support educational projects. The Institute offers aid to more than 47 countries 
around the world which cover sectors of relief, building and construction, culture, 
education, budget support and health. These projects are funded by individual 
donors, revenues from Islamic trusts (waqfs) and government support. 
c- Qatar Red Crescent 
The Qatar Red Crescent was the first volunteer charity association formed in 
the country in 1978. A member of the Arab General Secretariat of Red Crescent 
Associations, Qatar Red Crescent seeks to achieve the objectives of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent by alleviating human suffering in four 
key areas: disaster preparedness and relief, health care services, training and 
supporting vulnerable communities and capacity building.  
d- Munazzamat al-Da'wa al-Islamiia 
Munazzamat al-Da'wa al-Islamiia is an international NGO which was 
established in 1980, and began its activities in Qatar in 1987. It is funded by 
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individual donors and some support from the government. It is active in more than 
40 countries in various sectors such as education, culture, and social, economic 
and health development in the poorest communities of Africa and Asia.  
e- Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services 
The Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation for Humanitarian Services (RAF) 
launched its official humanitarian institution in April 2009. It is active in the areas 
of relief, education, social affairs and developing charitable work through 
capacity-building. Like Qatar Charitable Society, it is funded by individual 
donors, and it also benefits at times from government support to implement 
development projects.  
In addition to these five humanitarian and charity organizations, Silatech 
Foundation, Reach Out to Asia (ROTA), Al Fakhoora and Sheikh Jassim bin 
Jabor Al Thani Charitable Foundation are another important government partners 
in aid disbursement. These institutions, along with the governmental institutions, 
constitute central bodies in allocating Qatar foreign aid. While they are 
independent from the government in terms of structural organization, their 
activities in foreign countries conform to the foreign policy guidelines set by the 
Qatari government to direct the foreign aid of the state of Qatar. Resultantly, any 
attempt to examine Qatar foreign aid should also include foreign aid disbursed by 
these NGOs. 
 72 
 
To this end, next section examines changes that occurred in Qatar foreign aid 
since the eruption of the Arab Spring will be presented. 
 Finding and Analysis 
Pattern of Changes in Qatar Foreign aid  
A qualitative  analysis of Qatar Foreign Aid Reports in the span of four 
years  2010- 2013 reveals that the volume and the recipients of Qatar foreign aid 
were neither constant nor steady; rather, they were dynamic during the period of 
studies. This is more evident in the governmental aid than Qatari NGOs‟ aid. 
Despite this, the main purposes and objectives of Qatar aid in general remained 
identical from 2010 to 2013. 
In absolute term, the volume of Qatar governmental aid has experienced a 
substantial growth in 2011 compared to 2010. For example government aid stood 
at QR 1,075,299,095 in 2010; yet, this has doubled in 2011 to reach QR 
2,656,106,843. Distinguishingly, the volume has dropped in 2012 to QR 
2,007,969,847 before it was multiplied three times in 2013 to reach QR 
6,481,154,339. See figure 5. 
 73 
 
 
Figure (5) Volume of Qatar government aid between 2010- and 2013. 
6
 
External aid allocated by Qatari NGOs during 2010 is totaled QR 
799,690,991 and QR 806,333,142 in the following year. While we may 
notice that the two amounts are very similar, the following two years 
witnessed constant increase in the volume. For example in 2012 it has 
surged to QR 993,794,178 and climaxed to QR 1,327,835,368 in 2013. 
See figure (6). 
                                                 
6 This chart  and other charts in this chapter are developed by the author, and data are 
drawn from Qatar foreign aid reports 2010-2013 
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Figure (6) Volume of Non-governmental aid 2010-2013 
Similarly the recipients of Qatar development assistance have shown 
dramatic changes from 2010 to 2013. In this connection the geographical 
distribution of governmental aid indicates that Africa has been the prime recipient 
of governmental aid with total aid amounted to QR 2,856,027,684 that reached 
the continent between 2010 and 2011. Nevertheless, in 2012 and 2013 
respectively, Asia outdid Africa as the most continent that benefited from Qatar 
governmental aid with total amount of QR 4,297,069,841 channeled to Asia. See 
figure (7)  
Unlike the governmental aid, modest changes are noticeable in the 
recipients of NGOs‟ aid. Through the past four years, the highest share of NGOs 
aid is received by Asia. See figure (8). 
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Figure 7: Recipients of Qatar governmental aid 2010-2013 
 
Figure 8: Recipients of Qatar Non- governmental aid 2010-2013 
In terms of allocation of Qatar foreign aid to African continent, the flow of 
this aid to the continent has been consistent throughout the past four years in 
terms of volume and recipients. To this end, figures show that the largest share of 
governmental aid to Africa was received by North Africa while East Africa has 
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been the favorite recipient of for Non-governmental aid. This persisted throughout 
the years under study. See figures (9) and (10). 
 
 
Figure 9: Recipients of Qatar governmental aid 2010-2013 
 
 Figure (10): Recipients of Non-governmental aid in Africa 2010-2013 
With regard to the purposes and objectives of Qatar foreign aid, there are 
no noteworthy changes in this respect as Qatar foreign aid was disbursed to serve 
developmental and humanitarian causes. (See figure 11 and 12). Nevertheless, a 
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close observation of the figures shows that Qatar aid program was not specific to 
one particular purpose within the broad categories of development and 
humanitarian cause. In this regard, and within the development category budget 
support was the prime purpose of governmental aid between 2010 and 2011; 
however, in the following years (2012 and 2013), construction and reconstruction 
emerged as the main objectives of development aid. See figure 13. Similarly, 
education was the main purposes of NGOs in 2010, 2011 and 2013; nevertheless 
in 2012; their prime focus was on construction. See figure 11. In a sharp contrast 
and within the realm of humanitarian cause, both governments and NGOs‟ 
humanitarian aid was predominantly disbursed to serve relief works. See figures 
14, 15 and 16. 
 
Figure 11: Share of Humanitarian and Developmental Aid in Government Aid 
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Figure 12: Share of Humanitarian and Developmental Aid in Non-Government 
Aid 
 
 
Figure 13: Government’s development aid 
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Figure 14: Development aid of NGOs  
   
 
Figure 15: Government’s Humanitarian aid 
 
Figure 16: Humanitarian aid of NGOs 
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In relation to the first question of this thesis, the refereed charts and 
figures confirmed that profound changes have occurred in the architecture of 
Qatar foreign aid since 2010. These changes are equally observed in terms of the 
volume and size of the aid, countries that received the aid and purposes for which 
the aid was allocated. Nevertheless, the question remains to what extent these 
changes are related to the outbreak of the Arab Spring.  
The Impact of the Arab Spring on Qatar Foreign Aid 
 
Quantitative data and literature (Zoltan Barany, 2012; Echagüe, 2013; 
Haykel, 2013) evidence that the changes in the architecture of Qatar foreign aid in 
terms of volume and the recipient countries were determined by the Arab Spring
7
. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which the Arab Spring has remodeled the purpose of 
the overall Qatar foreign aid is generally imprecise and sketchy as the purposes of 
Qatar foreign aid prior to the eruption of the Arab Spring and after this event 
remained identical. While this characterized the overall aid of Qatar, there is 
insignificant evidence that the flow of Qatar aid to Non-Arab African countries 
during the same period was influenced by the Arab Spring. 
In terms of the volume, the governmental aid has increased dramatically in 
2011 compared to 2010 as the amount jumped from QR 1,075,299,095 in 2010 to 
QR 2,656,106,843 in 2011. The sudden and dramatic increase in the volume after 
                                                 
7 This is even more acute when we know that there is no certainty that GDP of Qatar has shown a 
significant curve in the past four years (Ministry of Development Planing and Statistics , 2012).  
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2010 could be explained in the context of Qatar foreign policy approach amid the 
Arab Spring. Post 2010 witnessed a surge in Qatar involvement in Arab Spring 
countries to champion the causes of the people in overthrowing regimes against 
whom they revolted. In Libya, Qatar involved militarily, and it reached out to 
Muslim Brotherhood braches in Tunis and Egypt(Z. Barany, 2013). Given the 
limited foreign policy tool at the disposal of the state of Qatar, beyond foreign aid, 
one can expect that Qatar‟s outreach to revolutionists in those countries was 
facilitated by its foreign aid. This is even acute when one considers that in 2011 
Qatar launched three quantitative aid funds for Tunis and Egypt. These include 
Qatar -Tunis Friendly Fund, Fund for Families of Injured People in Egypt and 
Fund for the People of Egypt. Qatar has allocated considerable amount of fund 
through these funds to these two countries, and it has also made a significant 
financial support to Morocco in order to avert the repercussion of the Arab Spring 
in that country(Ulrichsen , 2014)  
Allocation of larger share of Qatar foreign aid to these countries was a 
new development. Prior to the Arab Spring and during the reigns of Mubarak and 
Qaddafi, neither Egypt nor Libya was major recipients of Qatar aid. Therefore, 
while Darfur remained as main major recipient of Qatar aid, due to Qatar 
commitment to solve the crisis there, the sudden increase of Qatar aid in 2011 to 
North African countries of Egypt, Tunis, Libya and Morocco, confirmed the 
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effects of the Arab Spring on rise of the volume of Qatar foreign aid in 2011 
(Jamal, 2014). 
Whilst 2011 witnessed a rise in the volume of Qatar foreign aid, a sharp 
drop in the volume of aid was recorded in 2012.  Factors that could have caused 
this sudden drop can be contributable to the fact that the pledges and 
commitments announced by Qatar in 2012 were not fulfilled until the following 
year, and that the number of humanitarian crises were lower in 2012 compared to 
2011, in which Qatar made significant contribution to the crises of Somalia 
drought, Japan Tsunami and Gaza crisis2015). Even though these factors are 
apparently relevant in explaining the sharp drop in the volume of Qatar foreign 
aid, they are disputable when we know that the size of Nongovernmental aid, the 
humanitarian arm of the state of Qatar in crises, witnessed a slight increase in 
2012 (see figure 6), and if we also bear in the mind the dynamic of politics in the 
region in 2012, and Qatar responses to the political development in the Arab 
Spring countries. In 2012 the revolutionists in Tunis, Egypt and Libya have 
achieved their goals of overthrowing dictators; thus the resources that could be 
allocated by Qatar for these countries might be relatively low compared to 2011 
in the heyday of revolution. Moreover, most of the Arab Spring countries were in 
transitional period in 2012, and Qatar was prudent to disburse aid to transitional 
governments in Arab Spring countries. Thus, 2012 was year of hesitation and 
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doubt, and Qatar wanted to ensure the stability of the political climate before it 
will involve in those countries (Ulrichsen , 2014) 
 Additionally, while Qatar was the sole county that financially backed 
revolutionists in Egypt in 2011, 2012 witnessed introduction of new donors like 
Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait who also supported the transitional government in 
Egypt. All these factors could have contributed to the decrease of overall volume 
of Qatar foreign assistance. 
With regard to the recipients of Qatar aid, the largest share of Qatar 
foreign aid was received by Africa in 2011; however, in the consequent years, 
Asia overtook Africa as the most recipient of Qatar aid. In this connection, figures 
related to funds that are channeled to individual countries within Asia proved that 
changes in the recipient countries were dictated by the Arab Spring. For example 
while Syrian was missed in 2011 list of top recipients of Qatar aid, it was ranked 
as the most recipient country in 2012 and 2013 respectively. The Arab Spring 
factor in this is evident in Qatar diplomatic and political efforts to isolate Bashar 
Assad‟s regime and to support different factions, be they oppositions or militants 
on the ground, to uproot Syrian regime. Therefore, the nature and dynamics of 
crisis in Syria have influenced Qatar foreign aid in terms of recipients (Jamal, 
2014) 
On the other hand, the surge in the volume of Qatar foreign aid in 2013 
was connected to the Arab Spring. In 2013 Qatar and Saudi Arabia involved in 
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fierce competition over position and influence in the Middle East region. This 
competition was especially evident in Arab Spring countries where Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia have divergent positions and disagreement on the wide range of 
decisive issues. Such competition permitted Qatar to rely on its financial clout to 
bankroll its allies in those countries. In Syria, while both Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
hoped for the immediate overthrow of Bashar Assad regime, they favored 
different opposition groups to achieve this goal(Echagüe, 2013). In this 
connection, they both outreached to their allies through financial and military 
supports. Similarly, the first half of 2013 witnessed the election of Muslim 
Brotherhood to the presidency of Egypt; given Qatar pronounced support of the 
Brotherhood, its foreign aid to Egypt was increased to help President Muhammad 
Morsi to address the inherited economic problems(Z. Barany, 2013). This has 
attributed in the increase of Qatar foreign aid in general, and it might be 
accounted for ranking Syria and Egypt as well as Yemen among the first five of 
the most recipient countries of Qatar foreign aid (Foreign Aid Report 2013). 
In relations to the purposes of Qatar foreign aid, the main purposes of 
Qatar foreign aid remained identical before and after the outburst of the Arab 
Spring as aid were mainly disbursed for developmental and humanitarian causes. 
However, a close look at above  figures that show different sectors that are 
targeted by Qatar foreign aid in the period under study, it will be sufficient to 
argue that the Arab Spring has determined the purpose of Qatar aid to some 
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extent. For example, before the outbreak of the Arab spring, Qatar foreign aid was 
disbursed to finance construction and reconstruction works; however form the 
2012 to 2013, most of this aid was disbursed to support budgets and to finance 
construction works in recipient countries. The point that Egypt was ranked among 
five top recipient of Qatar foreign aid detonate that Arab Spring has shaped the 
purpose of this aid (Foreign Aid Reports 2011, 2013 &2013).  
On the other hand, while Qatar foreign aid can be viewed from the 
development and humanitarian perspectives, the ultimate motives for such aid go 
beyond developing the economies of recipient countries or providing 
humanitarian relief to the victims. Qatar foreign assistance bears political and 
diplomatic weights for Qatar especially when it is matched with activism in Qatar 
foreign policy since the Arab Spring and its political ambitions during the course 
of the Arab Spring. In the course of past five years Qatar has recalibrated its 
foreign policy to benefit from the political turmoil that ranged the MENA region 
in order to assume leadership position in the MENA region ( Haykel, 2013 p. 5). 
In this connection, it has utilized its long standing relationship with Muslim 
Brotherhood branches in Egypt, Tunis and Libya- who were playing leading role 
in the region amid the Arab Spring- to reinforce Qatar position in the region and 
to enhance its foothold to benefit from the Arab Spring. This can be observed in 
Tunisia, where Elnnahda party, the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, is 
closely allied to and sponsored by Qatar. The same holds true for the Muslim 
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Brotherhood in Egypt, which is close to Qatar‟s leadership as well as to Qatar-
based Islamic scholars like Yusuf al-Qaradawi ( Haykel, 2013: p.5). In these two 
countries, Qatar strategized its relations with Muslim brotherhood to dictate 
political scene in its favor by employing its foreign aid as policy tool  to carve out 
its images as champion of people right for democratic government. The greatest 
success Qatar has registered in this regard has been its successful persuasion of 
the people of these countries that Qatar, unlike other GCC countries, is advocators 
of people rights. This has also permitted Qatar to draw people attentions to its 
proactive foreign policy as emerging regional leader. 
The Arab Spring and Qatar Foreign aid to Africa 
 
Despite the magnitude of changes in Qatar foreign aid as the result of the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring, quantitative data echoed  literature (Antwi-Boateng, 
2013; Dugger, 2011) that the influence of this Arab Spring is not marked in the 
stream of the Qatar foreign aid to Africa. The volume and the recipient of Qatar 
development assistance to Africa remained stable and consistent in the last past 
four years, and the insignificant changes in recipients of Qatar foreign aid to 
Africa is connected to factors associated with political and economic 
developments in different African countries.  
Therefore, in terms of the volume, the review of data proves insignificant 
changes in relations to size of aid allocated for African countries. Within Africa, 
official development assistance from Qatar government has being received by the 
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North Africa region prior to the Arab Spring; thus, the outbreak of the Arab 
spring has only increased the flow of governmental aid to this region and the gap 
between North African and other African regions remained identical before and 
after the Arab Spring. This suggests that the Arab Spring has neither dramatically 
increased nor decreased the size of governmental aid to Non- Arab African 
countries. While this was the case with the governmental aid, East Africa and 
West Africa regions received more aid from Qatar NGOs than North Africa. This 
difference remained persistent despite the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. 
Additionally, the recipients of both the government and NGOs aid to Africa 
remained identical despite the outbreak of the Arab Spring; the increase in the 
size of NGOs aid to Central Africa and Southern Africa is isolated from the 
effects of the Arab Spring. Such increase was driven by humanitarian crises in 
these regions. Such crises include outbreak of humanitarian crises as a results of 
conflicts or civil wars in African Muslim countries. For example, Qatar charities 
doubled their entries into Africa on wake of Somalia drought in 2011, religious 
motivated conflict between Muslims and Christians in Central Africa Republic in 
2012 and after 2012's rebellion in Northern Mali which forced many Northern 
Malians to seek refuge in Niger(Tok & Calleja, 2014)   
Generally speaking and according to Qatar foreign aid reports, Qatar NGOs 
are the recognizable arms that distribute Qatar foreign aid in Africa; and despite 
recent improvement in Qatar relations with African countries, size of aid 
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disbursed by these NGOs to Africa outweighed that of the government. Therefore, 
while Qatar NGOs‟ aid favors Non-Arab African countries, Qatar governmental 
aid targets countries that have strategic interests to the Qatar. This explains why 
North African region exceeds other African regions in terms of size of aid it 
receives from the government of Qatar. North Africa is strategically important to 
Qatar from economic, security and political perspective; thus despite Qatar‟s 
strained relations with leaders of Egypt and Libya prior to the Arab Spring, the 
size of the state of Qatar's official development assistance to these countries was 
higher than those of  Non-Arab Africa countries. Qatar recent attempt to benefit 
from natural resources of African countries for economic diversifications and 
food security purposes is being carried out by relying on its NGOs to use their aid 
to make local environments in African countries favorable to outpouring of 
Qatar‟s investments in Africa. This mirrors the fact that most of Qatar NGO‟s 
secure stronghold of operation in East African countries which are considered as 
hotspots of Qatar investment in Africa(Dugger, 2011). 
Although there is no report of change in the motives of Qatar foreign aid to 
Africa, the fact remains that motives surpass altruism to include political, 
religious and economic motives. As Qatar recently hope to attain a respectable 
regional and international reputation, its substantial foreign aid to African 
countries via its NGOs is generally meant to generate positive goodwill to 
enhance its reputation among the beneficiaries. This gives Qatar potential 
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diplomatic weigh in relations to voting in international fora, and it yields strong 
foreign relations dividends from the recipient governments and countries in the 
foreseeable future as Qatar will become an attractive country to deal with 
politically(Antwi-Boateng, 2013).  By providing financial assistance to countries 
at a critical time of need, Qatar positions itself to influence mind and heart of 
people in communities where its investments exist. This could offer Qatar an edge 
for competition with aggressive competitors over Africa resources, and it could 
downturn local sentiment against Qatar land purchase hence creating favorable 
environment for its overall economic activities in Africa. Such approach is 
evident in Comoros Island where Qatar's large scale land purchases matches with 
its development projects that is being carried out by Qatar NGOs in this 
country(Dugger, 2011). 
Qatar‟s discriminative humanitarian assistance to Muslim countries also bears 
the flavor of promoting Islam as motives of providing humanitarian assistance 
exclusively to predominant Muslim countries or to Muslim communities within 
some African countries.  This might explains the reason why Qatar NGOs 
activities is marked in East and West Africa, where African Muslim countries 
exist, while the remaining region remained periphery in Qatar NGOs target 
regions. 
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Conclusion 
In the course of last four years, Qatar foreign aid has shown remarkable 
changes in terms of volume and recipients. These changes corresponded to the 
Qatar proactive foreign policy triggered by the Arab Spring. Therefore this 
suggests that the Arab Spring was formidable factor that has dictated changes in 
the size of Qatar foreign aid and the countries that benefit from this aid. 
Nevertheless, the waves of changes in the Qatar foreign policy and its wider use 
of foreign aid as the result of the Arab Spring could not encourage or discourage 
the flow of Qatar's foreign aid to Africa. Qatar foreign aid to Africa in the course 
of previous four years witnessed no significant changes as the volume, recipients 
and motives remained intact despite the Arab Spring. The small scale of changes 
that occurred in the aid provided by Qatar NGOs to Africa is related to factors 
specific to Africa. 
The stability in Qatar foreign aid flow to Africa, despite the dynamic of 
Qatar foreign policy, discloses that Africa occupies peripheral position in Qatar 
foreign policy priorities. Beyond its recent move to play a supervision role in the 
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African Union, the state of Qatar could not realize the importance of the Africa in 
the context of its struggle to optimize its gain from the Arab Spring. Generally, 
the Arab Spring offered rare golden opportunity for Qatar to strategize its 
relations with African countries and to move beyond mere diplomatic exchanges 
which has grown recently (Ashur, 2014). Economic and political crisis in Qatar 
traditional partners in Middle East as the result of the Arab Spring, the relative 
stability and economic prosperity in the small Gulf State of Qatar coupled with 
urgency for food security and economy diversification are sufficient opportunities 
for Qatar to further its engagement with African countries to enhance its regional 
position vis-a-via Saudi Arabia, which has been struggling to survive amid 
domestic and regional threats of the Arab Spring. The resourcefulness of Africa, 
its geographical proximity to Qatar and African need of capital to downturn the 
challenges of 21
st
 century constitute another opportunities that should permit 
Qatar to turn the preoccupation of other Middle East countries with the threats of 
the Arab Spring into its benefit by deepening its ties with Africa. As Qatar lacks 
alternative and meaningful foreign policy tool which is suitable for its 
engagement with Africa than foreign aid, its economic clout proved to be a viable 
and attractive tool to win the hearts and the minds of African leaders and public 
alike in a quest to advance its national interest in the continent. China bent on this 
strategies and it has yielded intended results in securing a footholds in the 
continent amid international competition over the African resources. The same 
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could have worked for Qatar should it has strategically exploited  its foreign aid to 
Africa in light of African's need to such aid to develop its aging infrastructure and 
build a formidable economic basis for its growing and ambitious youth segment 
of its population.  
In a broad term, there are economic and political justifications for Qatar to 
strategize its use of foreign aid to Africa.  Politically, both Qatar and African 
countries are weak at international level, and they cannot stand up for the political 
influences of the US, EU, China and Russian when it comes directing 
international issues according to one‟s national interests. Therefore, given the size 
of African countries, Qatar employment of foreign aid to get political reward from 
African countries will give Qatar political weight in general and voting power in 
regional international organizations in particular.  Economically speaking, there is 
unchallenged justification for Qatar to exploit its foreign aid to Africa for 
economic purposes to get agro-investment leverage in Africa. This is even more 
significant when Qatar's dire need for food security (Bailey, 2013), amid 
population boom, and the international competition over African untapped natural 
resources are considered. Providing foreign aid  to African countries to develop 
different economics sectors will not only contribute in speeding up the economic 
growth and the improvement of infrastructure and reduce unemployment rate 
among youths, it will also bring about more diplomatic, economic and political 
credits to Qatar in Africa (Swaniker, 2013). It will ultimately stress its regional 
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position, and it will put Qatar in favorable stand to further tap Africa resource for 
its national interests. 
Despite these outstanding economic and political justifications for 
providing aid to African, what should be appreciated is that such opportunity 
could be missed if the state of Qatar continues to rely upon its NGOs to carry out 
its foreign aid business in Africa, and if it does not diversify its target countries 
away from Muslim countries.  
Charitable organizations in Muslim world in general and in Qatar 
particularly have a deficiency in trained and competent human resources that 
could discover how their aid could be rationally tailored to the interests of their 
respective countries while operating in Africa in particular(Yumna, 2009).  In the 
meantime, their local partners in Africa also suffer from short vision of how these 
NGOs could tap different sectors that will be appreciated by governments of 
countries where these NGOs are operating. Therefore, to turn the works of its 
NGOs into its political gain, Qatar needs to revisit the activities of its NGOs in 
Africa. This is even necessary when we know that the activities of Islamic NGOs 
are overshadowed by provision of religious education which output is not tailored 
to local demands and labor markets(Dugger, 2011). Such flaws have generated 
large scale unemployment among the graduates of such education institutions as 
they lack necessary skills to be absorbed in labor market. This has gravitated 
enduring problems of unemployment in local communities they are working, and 
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it has been one factor that facilitated the breeding of terrorism and extremism in 
those communities. The prime examples of this case are Nigeria, Kenya and 
Somalia where the elements of Bok Haram and Al Shabab hailed from those 
schools. 
Additionally, there is a need for Qatar NGOs to reduce their safety-net 
projects that provide short term solution to long term problems. The feats projects 
of offering rams (Odheyah), breaking fast projects (Iftar Saem), clothing of poor, 
and cash out to poor communities are short term solution to a long term problem 
of deficient in human development. These projects should be superseded by more 
comprehensive development projects that will build the human capabilities of the 
beneficiaries and move them upward in economic ladder in order to be agents of 
themselves.  
Furthermore, as most of African countries are fragile states, where NGOs 
operate without the knowledge of governments, the recent rise in terrorism and 
concurrent doubt and uncertainty about the activities of Islamic based 
organizations in some Africa countries necessitates that Qatar NGOs work closely 
with governments to downturn this doubt. This is more important  when we take 
into account the recent case against in Qatar Charity in Northern Mali where it 
was accused of providing arms to rebels(Khatib, 2013). Unless this is considered, 
the environment is ripe for further accusation of Islamic NGOs of supporting 
terrorism in places where they work. The possibility of this is even higher in Non 
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Muslim countries where Qatar NGOs work exclusively with Muslim 
communities. 
While these policy options are prescriptive, they open door for further 
research into these hypothesis to see how Qatar NGO's could advance the 
interests of the governments. A comparison approach to compare the activities of 
Qatar charities with other western NGOs could be a good step in this context. 
Furthermore, it also provokes further research into investigating and examining 
opinions and stands of African governments towards the flow Qatar resources to 
Africa through the gate of NGOs. The result of these researches could help Qatar 
to manage its relations with African countries without extra need for official 
foreign aid from the government.  
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